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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background, motivation and main findings 
This constructive thesis builds a framework to assess breakthrough innovations for a case 
company in the Finnish forestry industry. The framework is based on the learnings from the 
best practices identified in academia, and based on interviews at the case company this thesis 
was conducted for. The main contribution of this thesis is the constructed framework. In 
addition to this, several other areas of improvement for the case company are discussed in less 
detail.  
The case company is a large forestry company based in Finland. The company has had to 
transform itself in recent years due to the shrinking demand of paper, and increasing demand 
of wood based products in other segments. The company still has a strong desire to increase the 
sales of new products, and especially breakthrough products, that the company characterized as 
completely new products going to new customer segments. The processes used at different 
divisions of the case company are mostly built to support the progress of non-breakthrough 
innovation projects. Therefore, there is a need at the case company to develop processes that 
cater for breakthrough innovation development. This thesis is written to support this initiative. 
Johnson (2001) discusses the importance of innovation for large organizations. He states that 
as business cycles decrease in length it is more crucial for large organizations to put innovation 
back on the agenda. However, many people “living and breathing large organizations” seem to 
have lost faith in the innovation ability of the company as the company reaches certain size.    
Innovation is not a monolithic phenomenon, but various processes that require different types 
of control systems. However, we know very little about how the management control systems 
vary for different types of innovation, how they are designed, how they are used and how they 
interact with informal control systems. (Davila et al. 2009) This thesis tries to partly answer to 
two of these four questions, how the control systems vary and how are they used. 
Nagji and Tuff (2012) characterized three types of innovation: 
• Transformational: Developing breakthroughs and inventing things for markets that do 
not yet exist 
• Adjacent: Expanding from existing business into “new to the company” business 
• Core: Optimizing existing products for existing customers 
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Nagji and Tuff (2012) examined the relative importance of transformational, adjacent and core 
innovations. They discovered that 70% of returns in high-performing companies come from 
transformational, 20% from adjacent and 10% from core innovations, meanwhile the resource 
allocation was 70% core, 20% adjacent and 10% transformational. This raises an important 
question, why do the companies allocate resources to projects that contribute so little to the 
returns? Developing transformational/breakthrough innovations is a great way for a large 
company to truly grow, as the growth of the company is not limited to the growth of their 
customers or growth of the customer segment, but the company can expand to new areas of 
business totally new to the company. Therefore, it is important to ask the question, how do 
companies assess transformational/breakthrough innovation projects, and to develop tools to 
assess that might suit that type of innovation better than the tools currently used. 
After conducting the interviews, it became quite apparent that the problems that the company 
had with assessing breakthrough innovation efforts were in line with Cooper and Edgett’s 
(2008) seven principles to improve new product development performance, a study that the 
author of this thesis did not know of when conducting the interviews. Their study examined 
105 companies’ new product development (NPD) performance, dividing the companies to three 
different groups, high performing (top 25%), average (average of all companies) and poor 
performing (bottom 25%). The study identified 7 principle that separated the best performers 
from the rest, and which other companies could potentially use to boost up their NPD 
performance: 
1. Customer focused with voice of customer work 
2. Heavy front-end loaded homework before development begins 
3. Spiral development – information loops with users through-out the development process 
4. Holistic approach driven by effective cross-functional teams 
5. Metrics, accountable teams & continuous improvement through post launch reviews 
and continuous learning. 
6. Focus and effective product portfolio management 
7. Next generation Stage-Gates, which are lean, scalable, adaptable, automated and 
support open innovation. 
The identified problems in the thesis interviews were closely alike with the principles 
introduced by Cooper and Edgett (2008). Therefore, the literature review (section 2) and the 
findings (section 4) are structured according to the seven principles. 
The eventual construct had multiple suggestions for the case company, with the main findings 
being that they should adopt a separate track to cater for breakthrough innovations in their stage-
gate model and that it would make sense for them to unify the processes between different 
divisions. Other identified suggestions are discussed in the construction section. 
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The breakthrough track would be much more iterative and much more front-end loaded, with 
the first two stages, concept shaping and concept validation, being treated almost as one stage 
rather than two different stages. Activities of the two stages could be conducted simultaneously, 
and the gate 1 between the stages would be to unlock more resources for the project. This thesis 
provides two options on which the case company could focus on in the gate 1 decision. The 
later parts of the stage-gate model would follow typical linear, less iterative, adjacent stage-gate 
process. The breakthrough process should focus in the early stages more on the learning aspects, 
how to get the project to benefit from the process rather than just controlling the process 
outcome. In the eventual go / no-go decisions at the gates non-financial factors should play 
more important role in the early parts of the process.  
Process unification would make sense for the case company for multiple reasons. It would 
enable the divisions to speak common language and share the best practices. Secondly it would 
enable the process development much more efficiently, when the company would be able to 
develop common processes rather than multiple parallel processes. It would eventually also 
make the sharing of resources, meaning people working with the development projects, possible 
between divisions. This would further benefit the sharing of best process practices and practical 
development knowledge, and it would also open a door for cross-divisional innovation project 
prioritization if the company has an urgent need to do so. 
The change process to having common process guidelines would not be an easy sell. In fact, 
there has been an attempt of innovation process unification a couple of years back at the case 
company. This process unification resulted in one-size-fits-all stage-gate model that had a 
lifetime of few weeks, after which the divisions started modifying this model to better suit their 
needs. Nowadays, the main reason behind the differences between the stage-gate processes at 
the divisions seems to be their mix of product innovations. The divisions with mostly adjacent 
innovations have a stage-gate model designed to cater for adjacent innovations, and divisions 
with mostly breakthrough innovations have a model catering their unique needs. The main 
problem with this one-size-fits-all solution may have been the fact that it indeed was one-size-
fits-all solution, which did not take into consideration the unique nature of breakthrough 
innovations. Therefore, adopting the first solution, meaning side-track for breakthrough 
innovations, could be the key for the adoption of the second solution, process unification. 
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1.2 Methods, structure and academic contribution 
This Thesis is a constructive case study in a single company context. It will use constructive 
research approach (CRA), which means it is problem solving through the construction of 
models, diagrams, plans etc. (Kasanen et al. 1993), or in this case problem solving through the 
construction of breakthrough innovation appraisal framework.  
The main data collection methods were interviews conducted with key players from the 
innovation departments of different divisions and from group-wide “Innovation and R&D” 
function. The heads of innovation, or persons closely connected with the innovation process 
development of their division, were interviewed from five divisions (see Table 4 for the full list 
of interviewees). Moreover, the construction was done in collaboration with people from the 
Innovation and R&D function throughout the process, verifying findings and cross checking if 
they have found similar problems with the problems identified in the interviews. 
The next section of the thesis is literature review. First topics of the literature review are related 
to innovation, and the use of stage-gate model commonly used to manage the innovation 
processes. Second section of the literature review focuses on management control systems in 
innovation management context. The third section of the literature review is structured 
following the seven principles identified by Cooper and Edgett (2008), and it explores the best 
innovation practices identified in academia. The last part of the literature review ties everything 
together, and ponders the identified best practices through breakthrough lens. 
The third section of the thesis discusses the research methods and the limitations of the thesis. 
Fourth section introduces the case company and presents the key finding. Fifth section discusses 
the findings of the fourth section in relation to the existing literature. Sixth section is the 
constructive section, which is structured to “tier 1” and “tier 2” issues. Tier 1 issues are the 
framework to assess breakthrough innovations, and process unification at the case company. 
Tier 2 issues are software tools for communication and communication overall at the case 
company, varying governance models for innovations and setting up clear go / no-go criteria, 
identifying home for breakthrough innovations, and last tier 2 topic discusses the early parts of 
adjacent innovations. The division to tier 1 and tier 2 does not imply the importance of the 
topics, the tier 1 issues are simply discussed in more detail.  The seventh section concludes the 
thesis, presenting key findings and offering possibilities for further research. 
This thesis does not have clearly defined research questions, it is more exploratory in nature. 
Even as this is the case, it takes inspiration from e.g. Davila et al. (2009) call for further 
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research: how do companies manage the resource allocation process around innovation, how 
do they combine objective and subjective measures of performance in innovation context, why 
do companies use stage-gate systems for their incremental innovation efforts? How do they 
manage radical innovation where plans are not going to be met? 
This thesis answers to Davila’s (2005) call to find out how to structure the control process to 
encourage new radical innovations emerge and prosper. This is done by constructing a 
framework to assess breakthrough innovations. The unique part of the framework, and the 
contribution of this thesis, is not in the detail of the constructed framework, the details 
themselves have been already identified in the academic literature, but in gathering the details 
into a single framework.  
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Innovation and innovation process 
2.1.1  Innovation, R&D, and NPD 
 
Innovation is a buzz word of the 21st century business world. In the academic literature, it is 
often paired with entrepreneurship (Johnson 2001) and research and development (R&D) 
(Enkel et al. 2009), and it has number of meanings attached to it (Johnson 2001). Therefore, it 
is crucial to clarify the meaning of this term, and discuss its difference to R&D and new product 
development (NPD).  The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
defines innovation as:  
“An innovation is the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or 
service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organisational method in business 
practices, workplace organisation or external relations.” 
OECD defines R&D as: 
“Any creative systematic activity undertaken in order to increase the stock of knowledge, 
including knowledge of man, culture and society, and the use of this knowledge to devise new 
applications.” 
The key difference in these definitions is that innovation is the implementation of knowledge 
to create products, services, or processes and R&D is the creation to increase the stock of 
knowledge. However, they are closely connected and innovation is dependent on R&D. 
Another key term in this context is NPD, which refers to development of new products. It is 
easy to see that these terms are intertwined. NPD can be seen as a subtopic of innovation, 
meaning innovation activities include NPD. 
Moreover, the word innovation can be divided to subsets, these subsets of innovations have 
diverse set of meanings attached to them. Maschitelli (2000) says that scholars have described 
these subset with terms like evolutionary versus revolutionary, incremental versus radical, 
continuous versus discontinuous, and sustaining versus disruptive. For example, Nagji and Tuff 
(2012) characterized three types of innovation: 
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• Transformational: Developing breakthroughs and inventing things for markets that do 
not yet exist 
• Adjacent: Expanding from existing business into “new to the company” business 
• Core: Optimizing existing products for existing customers 
 
The richness and diverseness of these descriptions of subsets remains a challenge. 
2.1.2 Characteristics of transformational Innovation 
Nagji and Tuff (2012) define transformational innovation as developing breakthroughs and 
inventing things for markets that do not yet exist. Denning (2005) describes that 
transformational innovation entails a transition from a known and secure mode of operating to 
one that is unknown and potentially chaotic. Championing transformational innovation is like 
going to (“guerilla”) war against all elements inside the organization that benefit from the status 
quo. Therefore, transformational innovation is naturally linked to change management, if the 
company succeeds in developing transformational innovations, during the process they also 
change their operating model to serve the new business segment. He further suggests that 
transformational innovations are by their nature also disruptive, as they introduce products and 
services that change the business landscape with dramatically different value propositions than 
their predecessors.  
Transformational innovation might get confused with other terms that describe similar kind of 
innovation, like disruptive innovation or breakthrough innovation. Christensen et al. (2015) 
speak about disruptive innovation and note that all breakthrough innovations are not disruptive 
innovations due to two factors, disruptive innovations originate from low-end or new-market 
footholds, and disruptive innovations do not catch up with mainstream customers before quality 
catches standards. These two factors have more to do with how the innovations affect, or 
disrupt, the current market, how they are originated and how they expand to different market 
segments, not based on the financial success of the innovation as one might first consider, and 
as they suggest is associated with breakthrough innovation. Disruptive innovations differ from 
transformational innovations as disruptive innovations do not have to be for new markets, they 
may be a new approach to the old market.  
According to Denning (2005) different kind of leadership is needed to enable transformational 
innovation, as traditional command and control models are more adequate to maintain the status 
quo than to contributing change. He continues that the process of introducing transformational 
innovation is inherently unstructured, there is no orderly sequences or phases even when the 
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management tries to establish such sequences and phases. However, there are pivot points that 
transform the dynamics of the communication about the transformational innovation, when the 
top management blesses the idea and when the benefits start to flow in. In essence, this divides 
the transformational innovation process to three parts: 
1. Before top management blesses the idea → innovator(s) need to persuade the top 
management  
2. After top management has blessed the idea → innovator(s) need to protect the idea 
against all the forces that benefit from the status quo 
3. Once benefits start to flow → the innovator / innovation is now the establishment and 
the opposition is “the guerillas” 
Narrative tools such as stories are in the center of the persuasion and they are complemented 
with traditional analytic approaches. It is crucial for the top management to understand this 
dynamic between transformational innovation and challenging the status quo, when thinking 
about disruptive growth strategies. (Denning, 2005) 
Herstatt et al. (2008) studied 497 Japanese NPD projects and compared radical versus 
incremental innovation projects. In their study, the radical innovations were characterized as 
new to the world products, which is closely alike with Nagji’s and Tuff’s (2012) definition of 
transformational innovations.  Incremental innovations included product modifications, cost 
reductions and repositioning in the market. The radical and incremental innovations differed 
significantly in two aspects in their study. The respondents learned significantly more in the 
radical innovation projects, and radical innovations also built a significantly higher competitive 
advantage compared to incremental innovation projects. The authors proposed that the biggest 
difference between the radical and incremental NPD projects is related to uncertainty, 
especially to the market and the customer uncertainty, as both these are totally new to the 
company. 
In the next sections of the literature review several studies using different terms for types of 
innovations that are that are closely alike with transformational innovations are cited. These 
terms are gathered in the table 1 below, and they are again explained as they appear in the later 
parts of the literature review for clarification. 
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Term for the innovation and source Meaning of the term 
Transformational innovation (Nagji and Tuff 
2012) 
Developing breakthroughs and inventing things 
for markets that do not yet exist 
 
Discontinuous innovation (Veryzer 1998) Radically new products that take leaps in terms 
of customer familiarity and use 
Radical innovation (Herstatt et al. 2008) New to the world products 
Disrtuptive innovation (Christensen et al. 2015) innovations that originate from low-end or new-
market footholds 
2.1.3 Stage-Gate approach to Innovation 
Cooper (1990) provides a stage-gate framework for NPD that has distinct stages and review 
points (called gates) between them. Figure 1 below illustrates an example of this framework. 
Stage-gate is both operational and conceptual model that helps to move a new product from an 
idea to market launch. (Cooper 1990)  
 
 
The stage-gate model divides the innovation process to distinct stages, and each stage has a 
group of prescribed activities, for example field tests or pilots. Usually, each stage is more 
expensive than the stage before. On the other hand, as more information is gained throughout 
the process, the risk is managed. The gates between the stages are where the process is 
controlled. Each gate has a set of deliverables or inputs, and a set of criteria for these 
deliverables. The output are the decisions at the gate, e.g. go / no-go / put on hold decisions for 
the project, and the action plan for the next stage. Usually a group of senior managers, with 
authority to allocate resources, act as a group of gatekeepers at each gate. (Cooper 1990) 
Table 1: Terms cited in this thesis that are closely alike with transformational innovation 
Figure 1: Stage-Gate Model (Cooper 1990) 
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Many companies have turned to different variants of stage-gate models (Phillips et al. 1999). 
According to Cooper (1990), companies are increasingly turning to stage-gate systems to 
reduce the cycle time and increase the “hit rate” of new products. However, they have also been 
said to be too time-consuming, time wasting and bureaucratic (Cooper 1993). 
Even as the origin of the stage-gate model is from the 1990s, it is still widely used, although in 
some cases with slight modifications. For example, Hertenstein (2000) surveyed 75 industrial 
design managers working in NPD, from this sample everyone reported that their organization 
is using a stage-gate model. Ettlie and Elsenbach (2007) found in their study that 48.6% of 
automotive engineering NPD managers use traditional stage-gate model and about a third use 
modified version of it.  
A more recent study from Cooper and Edgett (2012) that studied NPD processes of 211 US 
large business units, with median sales of 1B$, indicated that almost all, 90%, of the best 
performing (top 25%) companies had a formal and clearly defined stage-gate system in place, 
meanwhile from the worst performers (bottom 25%) only 44.4% had such system in place. 
Another major differentiator in their study was if the processes were really used or if the 
processes were just simply mapped out and in place. Of the best performing companies 60% 
indicated that they really use the formal process, and from the worst performers only 18.5% 
indicated so. 
2.2 Managemet control systems in innovation management context 
Guo et al. (2018) confirmed prior studies’ (Bedford, 2015; Bisbe & Malagueño, 2009, 2015; 
Bisbe & Otley, 2004; Cardinal, 2001; Davila et al., 2009; Stouthuysen et al., 2017; Ylinen & 
Gullkvist, 2014) reports that there is a positive association between management control 
systems (MCS) and product innovation in general. Their study examined three types of controls, 
input controls, behavior controls, and output controls in four different situations, process 
innovations in high- and low-technology sectors and product innovations in high- and low-
technology sectors. Input controls assist with the management of resources related to innovation 
(e.g. employee training and hiring new employees), behavior controls are mechanisms that 
regulate activities that convert inputs into outputs (e.g. formalized rules and routines), and 
output controls define targets that results are evaluated against (e.g. indicators of innovation 
results, market research activities). The results of the study are gathered to the table 2 below. 
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 High-Tech Product 
innovation 
Low Tech 
Input Control Positive association with only 
process innovation 
Positive association with only 
process innovation 
Behavior Control Equally relevant for process 
and product innovation 
Stronger positive association 
with process than product 
innovation 
Output Control Equally relevant for process 
and product innovation 
Equally relevant for process 
and product innovation 
 
Most interesting results from the point of view of this thesis are the roles of output controls, as 
project measures belong to this group, and the role of behavior controls, as stage-gate model 
fits to this group of controls. They both are relevant for both product and process innovations 
in both technology sectors.   
Davila et al. (2009) say that traditional control tools encourage command and control approach, 
and that they are designed to eliminate innovation, which is inefficient process because the high 
likelihood of failure. They cite Amabile (1998) saying control has been seen as a hindrance to 
innovation, which relies on motivation, freedom, experimentation and flexibility, and that the 
role of management control systems in innovation settings should be minimal.  They further 
say and cite that formal management control systems have been dissociated from innovation in 
favour of culture (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1997), team composition (Dougherty, 1992), 
communication dynamics (Allen, 1970) or leadership (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). However, 
Davila et al. (2009) emphasize that control mechanisms heavily influence the environment 
where the work happens, and thus their role in innovation should not be neglected.  
Davila et al. (2006) describe innovation as a process with stages. They highlight the need to 
actively manage the stages and rely on control systems to do so. Davila et al (2009) state that if 
managers treat innovation as “black box”, where the only formal control mechanism is the fund 
/ not-fund decision, managers can only hope that the clan control will lead to relevant beneficial 
project proposals. They propose that innovation requires formal tools that are flexible enough 
to take advantage of unexpected opportunities but strong enough to keep the right direction. 
Davila (2005) proposes that different kinds of innovations emerging from different levels of the 
organization benefit from different types of control systems and strategies. He divides the type 
of innovation to incremental (ideas that fit the current business paradigm of the company) and 
Table 2: Association between different MCS and product innovation. Guo et al. (2018) 
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radical (ideas that create a completely new business paradigm for the company) and the source 
of innovation to top management and the rest of the organization (see figure 2). Research that 
support quadrant 4, radical innovation emerging from the rest of the organization, is minimal. 
How to structure the control process to encourage new radical innovations emerge is an open 
question that this thesis tries to answer to. 
 
2.3 Seven principles of successful innovation 
Nagji and Tuff (2012) examined the relative importance of transformational, adjacent and core 
innovations. They discovered that 70% of returns in high-performing companies come from 
transformational, 20% from adjacent and 10% from core innovations, meanwhile the resource 
allocation was 70% core, 20% adjacent and 10% transformational. This raises an important 
question, why do the companies allocate resources to projects that contribute so little to the 
returns? 
Cooper and Edgett (2008) measured NPD productivity, measured by five-year sales from new 
products as a percentage of company’s total sales compared to R&D spending, also as a 
percentage of company sales, and noticed huge differences between the best (top 25%) and the 
worst (bottom 25%) performers within industries. The average difference between industries 
Figure 2: Control systems and strategies supporting radical and incremental innovations to 
emerge from different levels of the organization (Davila, 2005) 
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best and worst performers was almost 12 times, meaning the best performers got almost 12 
times sales compared to R&D spending as the worst businesses did. Figure 3 has a comparison 
of different industries best, average, and worst performers. They further listed seven principles, 
based on best practices identified from this sample of 105 firms, that companies can use to 
better manage their NPD process. Those seven steps, and related academic studies are gone 
through in the next sub-sections.  
𝑁𝑃𝐷 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 (𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠) 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑁𝑃𝐷 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 5 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠/ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)
(R&D Spending / Sales)
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.1 Customer focused with voice of customer work 
According to Cooper and Edgett (2008), the customer should be an integral part of the whole 
process, from idea scoping to development all the way to validation and beyond. Listening to 
the voice of the customer (VoC) should not be mixed with small incremental product 
improvements requested by the sales force, this goes beyond that, and aims to boost up 
development of breakthrough products. Some of the methods to capture VoC that were 
identified among best performing companies were:  
• Customer visits with in-depth interviews. The whole project team should 
take part in these. 
Figure 3: NPD productivity of best, average and worst companies from different industries 
(Cooper and Edgett, 2008) 
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• “Camping out”, a method where non-intrusive observation of the customers 
at their homes, factories or offices is conducted 
• “Lead user analysis”, working together with your customers to identify new 
solutions 
• Focus group problem detection sessions 
• Brainstorming events with customers, the customers are invited to 
“innovation day” where the attendees are working with company people in 
teams. The purpose of this is to “rip apart” the current products 
• Crowdsourcing using online based approaches, open your doors to customer 
wishes. 
Brettel and Cleven (2011) studied how partnering with externals affects the NPD performance 
of a company. They studied five different types of partners, customers, suppliers, universities, 
competitors and independent experts. Their study revealed that companies with heterogenous 
network of partners performed better in terms of sales turnover from new or improved products. 
Customers, suppliers and universities had positive effect on NPD performance, meanwhile 
partnering with competitors and independent experts did not have significant impact on NPD 
performance. 
Customer involvement had the strongest effect on NPD performance. Customer involvement 
helps companies to align their products to customer needs. However, found customer needs 
may represent the needs of just one specific customer while ignoring other potential customers 
or current customers (Bonner and Walker, 2004). Also, the customers may be unable to 
communicate their needs effectively even if they know precisely what they want (Thomke and 
Von Hippel, 2002).  
Suppliers were the second most important group contributing to NPD performance. 
Collaboration with suppliers helps companies to ensure that their products are producible, and 
to update their products to new technology (Primo and Amundson, 2002). Wasti and Liker 
(1997) suggest that long-term mutual relationship and geographic proximity favour supplier 
involvement. Doz (1996) reminds about protecting sensitive knowledge and avoiding serious 
dependency when collaborating with suppliers.  
Collaboration with universities also had a positive effect to NPD performance. According to 
Cohen et al. (2004) universities have two important roles, suggesting new ideas and helping 
with completing foundering projects. However, more effort in communication is needed due to 
the bureaucratic structures, so they are more suited for strategic long-term R&D partnerships. 
Enkel and Gassmann (2008) studied open innovation and the use of outside knowledge sources 
that firms use. Customers topped the list with 78% of firms out of 144 using customers as a 
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knowledge source. Other major sources in their study were suppliers 61%, competitors 49%, 
research institutes 21%, and other sources 65%, which includes for example partners from other 
industries.  
Veryzer (1998) studied eight firms’ discontinuous product innovations and their processes in 
doing these innovations. Discontinuous innovation refers to “radically new products that take 
leaps in terms of customer familiarity and use”. He found that four out of eight firms had formal 
processes to assess these innovations, but even in the firms where the processes were not 
established clear logic behind the development could be found. He found that the processes in 
the firms were less customer driven and more exploratory than in typical incremental innovation 
efforts. He proposes that discontinuous product innovations may be hard to understand for the 
customers due to their very nature, they break the logical chain of product evolution 
(incrementally adding characteristics based on needs). As the developed product might be 
totally unfamiliar to the customer, meaningful data cannot be gathered from the customers as 
they do not really grasp the purpose of the product. 
Sounders et al. (1998) studied 101 NPD projects at high-technology firms (R&D expenditures 
+5% of sales), and they suggest that both R&D/customer and R&D/marketing integration have 
a positive effect on NPD performance but these integrations benefit different areas of NPD 
performance. R&D/customer integration decreased cycle times, and improved R&D technical 
and commercialization effectiveness. R&D/marketing integration was found to be important 
for market forecast accuracy, product launch proficiency, commercialization effectiveness, and 
prototype development proficiency. They conclude that managers can use the different effects 
that R&D/customer or R&D/marketing integration have on NPD performance when they spot 
need to improve certain areas in NPD performance. 
2.3.2 Heavy front-end loaded homework before development begins 
Rationale behind having front-end loaded process is that the front-end loaded work pays itself 
back, as it leads to higher success rate and it also saves time further up the process. According 
to Cooper and Edgett (2008) the key issues to consider, in an order where they should be 
conducted, are: 
• Conduct a quick preliminary market assessment early in the process 
• Technical assessment and source of supply assessment, that e.g. includes 
probable materials and equipment needs, early in the process 
• More detailed market research (VoC), concept testing and value to the 
customer 
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• After the steps above, the acquired information is put into action, and more 
detailed product definition is done. Here the project scope, target market, 
product concept, features, value proposition, target price and other high-level 
specs are specified. 
• After this it is time for detailed financial and business analysis, using the data 
that has been gathered. This could include e.g. net present value (NPV) or 
internal rate of return (IRR). 
An example of heavy front-end loaded homework working in practice comes from Toyota. 
Toyota’s lean product development process has gained a vast number of admirers, and it has 
outperformed its American competitors in terms of faster product development cycles, and 
doing so while using significantly less engineers. The Toyota NPD process is a complex entity 
and it would be unfair to point out a single factor for their success. This being said, one key 
aspect in their product development is heavy front-end loaded homework that results in time 
savings through less design modifications at the next parts of the development. (Balle 2005) 
Toyota seeks to identify all possible troubles early on, and tackle the problems at their sources. 
In this “noisy” first stage many alternatives are explored. A process of ambiguity and 
negotiation leads to conflicts, that are often solved by customer satisfaction criteria. As the 
design process progresses, the sets of solutions narrow gradually based on information received 
from stakeholders. This progressively reducing specifications and resolving ambiguity leads to 
considerably shorter development cycles, as the later stages of the process move smoothly. 
During this critical first stage product engineering, manufacturing engineering, purchasing and 
quality have representatives working closely with each other in the leadership of the projects 
Chief engineer to make sure different perspectives are understood. After this first exploratory 
stage, comes “detailed planning” stage where drawings of the product are realised, with a goal 
“Zero EC”, meaning no engineering changes once the drawings are realised. (Balle 2005) 
According to Veryzer (1998) the major difference between NPD processes of incremental and 
radical innovation lie in the fuzzy front-end. Herstatt et al. (2008) studied 497 Japanese NPD 
projects and discussed the benefit of having fuzzy front-end loaded development process for 
NPD projects in general, and for radical compared to incremental innovation projects. 
According to Cooper (1998), the fuzzy front-end covers the idea generation, initial screening, 
preliminary evaluation, and concept evaluation stages. Cooper (1998) stresses that in the fuzzy 
front-end both marketing and technical activities are important, while the inadequate market 
analysis in the fuzzy front-end being number one reason for new product failures. Herstatt et al 
(2008) findings indicate that the fuzzy front-end development reduces both technical and 
market uncertainty of projects and that it leads to higher efficiency (financial and personnel 
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resources planned to conduct the project versus actually used resources) and effectiveness 
(evaluated project outcome versus actual project outcomes, e.g. meeting profit targets, customer 
satisfaction and competitive advantage). They found that both radical and incremental NPD 
projects benefit from the fuzzy front-end work. 
So, the front-end loaded work reduces uncertainty and results in better estimates related to 
efficiency and effectiveness (Hestatt et al. 2008). The main contributor in their sample of firms 
for the reduced uncertainty were customers, while the second most important information 
source were competitor analyses. The firms gathered customer information via direct contact, 
but the companies also evaluated customer complaints and conducted surveys. They concluded 
that frequent customer contact in the fuzzy front-end development was a key to NPD projects 
success. The customer requirements were understood fairly well after the front-end 
development but the companies seemed to have trouble in translating the customer requirements 
to product specifications. The authors propose there seems to be a lack of communication 
between marketing and technical people, the requirements are not translated to technical 
language. This was even more evident in radical NPD projects.  
Herstatt et al. (2008) found that in the planning phase, it was significantly harder to estimate 
the market size and the customer price sensitivity for radical innovations compared to 
incremental innovations. Also, potential competitors and their products were harder to estimate 
in radical innovations. 
Bertels et al. (2013) discussed the drivers for success in breakthrough and incremental product 
development in the front-end of the development. The front-end refers to be the first parts of a 
typical stage-gate model, the discovery of the idea, idea scoping and building the business case. 
According to Bertels et al. (2013) the three most important areas in the activity development 
for incremental products in the front end of innovation process that separate successful 
companies from less successful companies are current market knowledge, idea enrichment 
(information system the company uses for sharing, capturing and building new ideas), and 
concept definition (formal methods for understanding the market and sales efforts, technical 
aspects, manufacturing feasibility and economics, basically the formalness of the business 
plan). The current market knowledge is the most important activity of the three. They propose 
that standard approaches, such as focus groups, are not performing well enough in providing 
deep insights needed. Ethnographic techniques, where the customers are observed in their own 
environment produce a better result, e.g. watching the consumers using the products in real 
situations to spot possible nuisances. 
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Bertels et al. (2013) studied also breakthrough product success in the front-end of the 
development, and they found that current market knowledge, white space disruptive market 
knowledge and idea enrichment using technology inventions were important for the success. 
Idea enrichment using technology inventions refers to the extent that the company is assessing 
new technologies and technology-driven inventions. The concept definition, meaning the 
formalness of the business plan was not critical factor in the success of breakthrough products. 
However, they propose that the process of building the business plan may be beneficial.  
According to Bertels et al. (2013) the white space disruptive market knowledge refers to the 
degree to which the company looks for new disruptive business and technology opportunities, 
reviews those business and technology opportunities and is willing to accept lower margins 
than in their current business for those opportunities. They argue that understanding the white 
space market is fundamentally different process than understanding the current market. They 
site Lynn et al (1996) who examined breakthrough projects from General Electric, Motorola 
and Searle, in those projects the products did not follow the Stage-Gate process. They relied on 
“probe and learn” approach, which was an iterative process, where the early versions of the 
product were tested in the market, redesigned based on the feedback and then tested again. They 
give another example citing Garvin and Levesque (2005) who studied IBM’s highly successful 
emerging business opportunity (EBO) unit. The EBO is separated unit at IBM that focuses on 
exploring the white space opportunities. According to them, understanding the needs of the 
market in a new opportunity is an iterative process, and sometimes it would take a year to a 
year and a half to get the strategy right, it could change multiple times during the process.  
Bertels et al (2013) conclude that understanding the market is important for both incremental 
and breakthrough innovations but formal methods for quantifying the market and sales were 
important drivers of success only for incremental products, not for breakthrough products. The 
processes and practices for breakthrough product development are significantly different than 
for incremental product development. More iterative and learning approach has proven to be 
more successful in breakthrough product development. 
Evans et al. (2013) say that the primary reason for new products to fail is insufficient time and 
resources spent at the front-end of the development. The time and resources are spent in the 
front end to build an extensive knowledge base before making significant investments in the 
development. This enables companies to fail fast, and avoid spending significant resources later 
in the process to products that are not viable or do not fit the strategy. They continue that the 
front-end involves much more than listening to the voice of the customers, it involves 
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conducting detailed competitive analysis, understanding the global trends shaping the 
opportunity and gaining diverse perspectives of different thought leaders. For the best 
performing companies the front-end of the innovation is jointly owned process that takes into 
consideration multiple different perspectives. For the higher-risk, long-term projects, some 
companies use incubators to foster them in safe space, allowing the gathering of information 
and addressing difficult challenges without exposing them to intense scrutiny. 
2.3.3 Spiral development – information loops with users through-out the development 
process 
According to Cooper and Edgett (2008), testing with the customer in real time is crucial so that 
the developed product does not come out of the stage-gate model as already outdated. There 
could be many reasons for this. The markets may have shifted, other competitive products may 
have been introduced or the customer simply did not know what she wanted. Integrating spiral 
development loops “build-test-feedback-and-revise” to the stage-gate model may help the 
company to avoid such misperceptions. See Figure 4 for a visualization of this process. 
 
Veryzer (1998) studied eight firms’ discontinuous innovation processes. He proposes that what 
really seemed to be the key in these types of projects was prototyping much before than in 
typical incremental innovation projects. First prototypes preceded opportunity analysis, 
assessment of market attractiveness, market research, and financial analysis. He characterized 
the overall process messy and the progression of activities to be sometimes unconventional, as 
Figure 4: Spiral development loops integrated to stage-gate model (Cooper and Edgett 2008) 
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new technology is adapted to product applications, it is an iterative process. This was especially 
so in the early parts of the NPD process. However, he had a differing opinion to Cooper and 
Edgett (2008) about involving customers in the feedback loop early in the process for 
discontinuous innovation projects.  
Herstatt et al. (2008) spoke about the prototyping as a tool to reduce uncertainty in the front-
end of development. The prototypes could be early physical prototypes or virtual prototypes. 
They argue that the use of prototypes can reduce both technical and market uncertainty. The 
prototypes can be used for checking the technical feasibility and for communicating with 
different stakeholders, including team members, customers and management. Herstatt et al. 
(2006) studied Japanese companies and found out that almost 90% of them used early physical 
prototypes, meanwhile 11% used virtual prototypes. Similar to this, Souder et al. (1998) found 
out in their study, that higher perceived technical uncertainty leads to higher design change 
frequency in NPD projects. 
 
2.3.4 Holistic approach driven by effective cross-functional teams 
Cooper and Edgett (2008) suggest that NPD projects should have cross-functional team that 
sticks together from the very beginning of the project all the way to the end. The team should 
also have a clear leader who leads the project passionately from the beginning to the end. The 
team should be held accountable for the project, measuring the team’s performance against 
previously defined success criteria. 
Sounders et al. (1998) study indicates that R&D/marketing integration has a positive effect on 
NPD effectiveness, and they propose that due to this positive effect, the expense of maintaining 
high collaboration with R&D and marketing people is justified. They also propose that when 
the uncertainty (technical and market) is higher there especially is need to limit this uncertainty 
with collaboration. For example, in their study they found out that higher market uncertainty 
affects product launch proficiency and market forecast accuracy, meanwhile R&D/marketing 
collaboration positively affects the product launch proficiency and market forecast accuracy. 
Therefore, the higher the uncertainty, the more need for collaboration there is. 
Dougherty (1992) also speaks about the value of collaboration between marketing and technical 
people in innovation context. She says that the commercial success of new products depends 
on its design meeting with customers’ needs, and that effective design requires that 
technological possibilities are linked with market possibilities, where collaboration between the 
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departments is the key. Dougherty’s (1992) research was not limited to marketing and technical 
collaboration, she further discussed that collaboration with also manufacturing and sales 
departments leads to success of new products.  
However, Dougherty (1992) notes that there are also barriers to collaboration. All these four 
departments have their own “interpretive schemes” that barrier the collaboration, and linking 
the market needs with technical needs. These interpretive schemes form the context where the 
people think, they provide shared assumptions about reality, they identify what issues are 
relevant for that department, and they affect how people make sense of those issues. She 
proposes that because of these interpretive schemes, the departments tend have different focus 
related to the technological-market knowledge, possibly none of them understanding the whole 
picture. She says that organizational routines tend to separate, rather than coordinate these 
different thought worlds. According to her, correcting these interpretive barriers requires both 
cultural solutions and structural changes within the innovation organization. She proposes three 
different processes that are all needed to overcome these barriers: 
1. Building on the Thought Worlds. All the departments (thought worlds) may focus on 
aspects that others ignore. All thought worlds should contribute to the design, and actively 
challenge each other. 
2. Developing Collaboration Mechanisms. She proposes that structures alone will not solve 
the collaboration issue, the participants of interdisciplinary teams may still rely on people 
from their own thought worlds when issues arise. She proposes that shared customer 
understanding may be a key here, and taking joint responsibility for customer related 
activities, such as market research plans, technology audits, customer focus groups and 
visits with users could enhance collaboration 
3. Developing the Context for Collective Action. She proposes that the interactions between 
the though worlds should be based on joint-development and appreciation, and that product 
definitions should be collectively understood based on first-order customer knowledge. 
Managers can build this context of collective action by fostering the processes of joint 
learning, customer interaction, and knowledge development.  
Troy et al. (2008) studied 25 different studies that examined the effects of having cross-
functional integration in innovation projects and how this affected different aspects of new 
product success. Their findings indicate that cross-functional integration may have a direct 
effect on new product success but the combination of cross-functional integration with many 
  
22 
 
other factors may be more significant. For example, they found that the organizational level on 
which the integration happens has a significant impact on the integrations success. Integrating 
teams (different background people working on a single project) had much higher effect on new 
product success than collaborating higher up on organizational level. They also suggest that 
high-tech industries may benefit more from cross-functional integration than low-tech 
industries (who also benefit but less), and services may benefit more from collaboration than 
products. They conclude that most of the variables that they found to significantly affect the 
new product success were managerially controlled (e.g. level of integration, type of information 
shared, which functions and how many functions to integrate) or context specific (e.g. industry, 
product / service, and country of origin), and thus management can capitalize on their 
knowledge on their products, firm characteristics and external factors to design the type of 
cross-functional integration that best suits their specific situation.  
2.3.5 Metrics, accountable teams & continuous improvement through post launch reviews 
and continuous learning. 
Cooper and Edgett (2008) say that the best performing businesses put metrics, or in other words 
success criteria, in place and measure the performance against planned target values. The 
project team and the leader should declare their projections for the metrics as part of the overall 
business case at the go-to-development gate. Based on these projections and other data, the go-
to-development decision is made, and later in the upcoming gates the project team is held 
accountable for achieving the targets, and that affects the go / no-go decision at the gates. The 
most popular metrics are sales and profit measures. Metrics that capture time, like time-to-
market were used by over 80% of the companies. Other measures mentioned were customer 
satisfaction related, like returns, complaint tracking, and customer surveys. 
According to Cooper and Edgett (2008), one common pitfall that businesses do is not measuring 
the performance of new products after the launch against the targets set during the development 
phase. Only 22.1% of the companies in the study had post-launch reviews. This makes holding 
the project team accountable for the results impossible, also learning and continuous 
improvement cannot be done properly without this step. The post-launch review can be seen as 
the last step of accountability for the project team. Measuring actual numbers against the target 
values, spotting variances and conducting root cause analysis based on the variances enables 
learning, and results in better project performance in the future.  
Other authors also speak about the link between measuring performance and managing 
performance. According to Lebas (1995) performance management and performance 
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measurement are not separable, performance management proceeds and follows performance 
measurement. According to Bourne and Bourne (2011) performance management and 
performance measurement involve a vide set of skills and activities, ranging from strategic 
thinking and detailed analysis to more soft skills such as facilitating discussions to gain 
commitments to actions, to make sure things really happen based on the measurements. Bourne 
and Bourne (2011) says that the basic five roles of performance measurement systems are: 
1. Establishing your current position 
2. Communicating direction 
3. Influencing behavior 
4. Stimulating actions in the most important areas for your business 
5. Facilitating learning 
As Cooper and Edgett (2008) mentioned, post launch reviews can be powerful tools in 
organizational learning, spotting variances and conducting root cause analyses based on those 
variances. However, studies from Vaivio (1999 and 2001) suggest that non-financial measures 
could have a learning aspect through the whole project, as the non-financial numbers can do 
more than passively monitor and communicate. Non-financial numbers cause new dimensions 
of performance to become visible to other parts of the organization and they stimulate 
discussion, which assist in knowledge sharing and even new knowledge creation as a result of 
the discussion.  
When it comes to what kind of measures should be used in innovation context, authors argue 
that it depends on the type of innovation, and the stage the innovation is in. Nagji and Tuff 
(2012) suggest that traditional financial metrics are appropriate to evaluate core and adjacent 
innovations but they assess poorly transformational efforts in the early stages. They propose 
that financial figures should eventually have more role for transformational innovations also, 
in later stages when more information is acquired. Bertels et al (2013) found that quantifying 
market and sales numbers in the front-end of development were important drivers of 
incremental product development projects success but for breakthrough products they did not 
have a significant value. Similar to this, Herstatt et al (2008) found out that the market size and 
customer price sensitivity were significantly harder to estimate for radical innovations than 
incremental innovations. Bertels et al (2013) found out that the business plan itself did not have 
a significant impact on breakthrough products success, meanwhile they did not rule out that 
while the plan itself did not have impact, the process of conducting the plan might have had 
impact.  
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So, it seems clear that financial numbers and market numbers are appropriate for adjacent type 
innovation projects also in the early parts but for transformational type efforts, something 
completely different is needed. Nagji and Tuff (2012) propose that the companies should do the 
polar opposite of financial numbers to assess transformational efforts in the early stages. They 
propose using a combination of non-financial and internal metrics, that would enable the 
organization to learn. As an example they mention Google, who has only one initial hurdle for 
transformational innovation efforts. That hurdle is that the company is likely to learn from the 
effort, financial and market factors come later in the process when they have something to pilot. 
The importance of measuring performance in innovation context more generally has been 
acknowledged as well. Using balanced scorecard (BSC) or key performance indicator (KPI) 
type sets of measures in innovation context or in project management is not a new idea, e.g.  
Bremser and Barsky (2004) and Stewart (2001). 
Bremser and Barsky (2004) studied the use balanced scorecard in R&D context. They 
recommend participative cascading approach that links organizational level BSC to BSCs used 
at lower levels of the organization. The idea of their model is simple, to link organizational 
level BSC metrics to lower level BSC metrics, in this case R&D departments metrics. As the 
higher-level metrics have been designed in collaboration, the R&D department further 
communicates these targets to lower levels of the organization, e.g. R&D units, and they design 
R&D unit level BSCs that are linked to the R&D department BSC. They further suggest that 
metrics used in the organization’s stage-gate model can be connected to the BSC. For example, 
the organization might have firm level measure “time to market” that is linked to R&D 
department’s measure “number of product ideas approved for gate X” that is further linked to 
R&D units’ measures about their project progress.  
Stewart goes even further (2001) suggesting that individual projects can be considered as “mini-
organizations” that require the same kind of clarification and benchmarks as the parent 
organization. She proposes that to better manage projects, health checks utilizing balanced 
scorecard approach should be used throughout the project life cycle. According to her, “on-
time, on-budget” objectives are the most common measures in most of the organizations for 
projects. Shifting the focus to more comprehensive BSC type approach companies would get 
better understanding on how individual projects benefit the whole organization, how well they 
are managed, how the management could improve (the project), and what is the strategy aspect 
of the project. The tool she proposes would be used to analyse projects on a portfolio level 
rather than on a single project level. She further says that the inputs and outputs of BSC must 
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be clearly defined, as what is not clearly defined cannot be clearly measured. She also suggests 
that companies should set goals for the measures, evaluate its position in relation to the future 
goals, and have a plan on how to achieve said goals.  
However, in practice not all companies have these a formal links between performance 
measurement and innovation. Hertenstein (2000) examined performance measures in NPD 
context. She found that many firms do not use any kind of measures for NPD performance 
explicitly. However, the firms that did use, used both nonfinancial and financial measures. The 
link between the measures and company level strategy were preserved weak, unlike for example 
Kaplan and Norton (1992) and Bourne (2011) say it should be, and further improvements in 
this area were requested by the surveyed NPD managers. Moreover, the managers were 
generally dissatisfied with the NPD performance measurement.  
2.3.6 Focus and effective product portfolio management 
According to Cooper and Edgett (2008) most of the organizations have too many product 
development projects underway for their limited resources, and their project portfolios contain 
too many low-value projects. The product development projects should be carefully analysed 
and focused through effective project portfolio management system, starting with a larger pool 
of projects and by systematically removing the weaker ones with series of gates. 
Formal portfolio management systems are rare in even the best performing businesses, from 
whom 31% indicated having such system. They are still significantly more likely to have such 
system compared to poor performing businesses, with only 3.8% of them indicating that they 
have such system. To somewhat similar extent, the best performing businesses are 
outperforming the poor performing businesses in balance between number of projects and 
resources available, they have better balance of short-term and long-term projects, and their 
project selection results in higher value-to-the-corporation projects.  
Some tools that the high performing businesses indicated to use in their formal portfolio system 
include: 
• Strategic Buckets: setting up buckets of resources for certain type of projects (e.g. 
project type, market segment, technology) 
• Product and Technology roadmaps: map out major technologies, platforms, and 
projects that are needed in the next 5-7 years. 
• Scorecards: Gatekeepers employ rigorous qualitative methods at the gate meetings 
to pick out and prioritize the best development projects. 
• The Productivity Index: financial tool that tries to maximize the overall value of the 
portfolio subject to personnel or financial resource constraints. 
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The end goal of any project portfolio management is simple, to invest the scarce resources to 
the projects that benefit the company the most in the long run. Cooper et al. (1999) definition 
of portfolio management: 
 “Portfolio management is a dynamic decision process, whereby a business’s list of active new 
product (and R&D) projects is constantly updated and revised. In this process, new projects are 
evaluated, selected and prioritized; existing projects may be accelerated, killed or 
deprioritized; and resources are allocated and reallocated to different projects…” 
Cooper et al. (1999) investigated how 205 large U.S. companies manage their R&D and new 
product portfolios, and they found vast differences between the companies’ practices and their 
performance. They identified 4 groups of companies based on two factors, surveyed 
management fit and overall quality rating of the portfolio methods used. Unsurprisingly, the 
benchmark businesses, companies with high management fit and quality rating, had the best 
performing portfolios both economically and in strategy alignment. They also tended to use 
more methods (almost 3 on average) than the other groups. More interesting is to examine the 
techniques used. Financial models (like NPV, IRR) were used the most often but ironically, 
they resulted in the worst economic value. Strategic approaches (business’s strategy is the basis 
for money allocation) and scoring models (projects are scored based on multiple criteria) were 
the next popular models, and they yielded the best performing portfolios. Combination of 
multiple methods resulted in a better performing portfolio than just relying on one method. 
Benchmark businesses relied less on financial methods and more on strategic methods. 
According to the authors, what seems to really set benchmark businesses apart from the rest of 
the companies was that they employed a much more formal and explicit methods, and 
consistently for all the projects. 
According to Sanchez and Robert (2010) most indicators used in project portfolios are financial 
or schedule based. They propose that companies should develop KPIs for project portfolios 
taking into consideration the strategic perspective and the objectives of the portfolio. The KPIs 
would measure the realization of key benefits of the projects and achievement of portfolio level 
objectives. The key strategic performance indicators would be used to early detect performance 
variances that may hinder achieving the strategic objectives of the project portfolio, and 
corrective actions would be taken if the indicators suggest that project(s) are performing below 
par.  
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Cooper and Edgett (2012) studied the innovation practices of 211 US large business units. Their 
findings indicate that gatekeeping role should be clearly defined. From all businesses 70.8% 
had clearly defined gatekeepers and from the best performers (top 25%) the number was even 
higher with 85%. More differences between the companies arise when the question if 
gatekeepers may change from gate to gate depending on the evolving risk profile of the project, 
or from project to project depending on the risk level of the project. From worst performers 
(bottom 25%) only 18.5% had changing gatekeepers, meanwhile from the best performers 45% 
did. The authors suggest typically in larger and more risky projects, higher level executives 
should typically act as gatekeepers, meanwhile in low risk projects lower level personnel may 
act as gatekeepers. However, even in large or riskier projects, senior people do not necessarily 
have to make all the gate decisions, for example idea screen where significant commitments are 
not yet required. In 35% of businesses they studied, gatekeepers changed from gate to gate, and 
in 26.2% the gatekeeper group was totally static. Moreover, the meaningful contribution of 
gatekeepers, meaning for example coming prepared to the meeting, asking insightful questions 
and understanding the project prior to the meeting, differed significantly between the worst 
performers, from whom 14.8% indicated so, and best performers (52.6%). 
When it comes to the go/kill decisions for projects, Cooper and Edgett (2012) study indicates 
that simply having criteria defined is a strong differentiating factor between the best performers 
(85% of businesses employ) and worst performers (25.9%). Often these criteria are in form of 
scorecard that evaluates the merits of the project. However, what the scorecard should 
specifically include for different types of projects in different stages is less examined question, 
and one where further research should be conducted. Another key best practice is having 
defined deliverables, with 90% of the best performers indicating having this, the number is 
significantly lower within worst performers, 46.2%. Often these deliverables are in form of 
templates. However, again what the templates should consist of for different types of projects 
at different stages is an issue where research is limited.  
The best performers seem to fare much better also in objectivity and fact base for their decisions, 
in respect that the decisions are indeed made at the meetings, and in gatekeeper support for the 
made decisions. From the best performers 57.9% indicated that their decisions at the gates are 
“objective and fact based”, meanwhile from the worst performers 14.8% indicated so. From the 
best performers 60% said they indeed do go / kill decisions at the meetings, from the worst 
performers only 25.9% did. In some companies the gate decision meetings seem to be more 
information sessions about the project updates than decision making forums. Support for the 
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made decisions refers to unanimity of the decisions by visibly supporting the gate decisions, 
and by committing resources from their departments to the projects based on the decisions. 
From the best performers 66.7% indicated having this, and from the worst only 14.8% did. 
 
2.3.7 Next generation Stage-Gates 
According to Cooper and Edgett (2008) companies are now building the next generation Stage-
Gates, which are lean, scalable, adaptable, automated and support open innovation: 
• Lean: Companies have borrowed value stream analysis method from lean 
manufacturing, and they systematically try to eliminate non-value adding steps from 
the development process in order to streamline the process and accelerate the time-
to-market. 
• Flexible and adaptable innovation process: Stage-gate model is able to adapt to 
changing conditions and unstable information. It supports simultaneous execution 
of activities within different stages. Even whole stages can overlap. They propose 
that the key is to weight the cost of delay of the project and the cost of being wrong. 
Not waiting for the perfect information may be the right thing to do in some cases. 
• Scalable process: Stage-Gate model is not one-size-fits-all solution. The different 
projects range from high-risk platform development projects to small-scale product 
improvements. The different projects contain significantly different levels of risks. 
The nature of the Stage-Gate should vary depending on the project. 
• Automated Stage-Gate: Companies utilize software tools to make the Stage-Gate 
process and the pipeline visible in real time. 
• Open innovation: Stage-Gate systems can be modified to accommodate open 
innovation. For example, P&G has built a system that enables their network of 
partners to participate in the process all the way from ideation to product launch.   
 
Other studies also acknowledge that some modifications to the basic idea of stage-gate models 
have emerged, like adding scorecards to the gates, self-managed or online gates, integration 
with portfolio management, or building better governance models (Cooper 2009). Grönlund et 
al. (2010) have built a model to incorporate open innovation theme to stage-gate model. Still, 
the basic idea, systematic stages with gates where the go / no-go / hold decision are made, 
remains strong. The idea of not having one-size-fits-all stage-gate model is also in line with 
Davila (2005) proposition that different kinds of innovation benefit from different types of 
control systems.  
Cooper and Edgett (2012) studied 211 business units NPD performance, and divided the 
companies to best performing (top 25%) and worst performing (bottom 25%). They examined 
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the use of rigid one-size-fits-all process compared to having flexibility and scalability in the 
process to cater for needs of different risk-level projects. In practice, this could mean for 
example having a full stage-gate model for longer high-risk projects, and shorter streamlined 
version for small product enhancements. On average 62.3% of companies indicated having this 
flexibility in their processes. From the best performers 75% indicated so, and from the worst 
performers only 37% had such processes 
2.4 Summary of discussed theory 
There are huge differences between the best and worst performing companies when it comes 
to NPD productivity (Cooper and Edgett 2008). What we know is that most of the returns in 
high-performing companies NPD come from transformational innovations (Nagji and Tuff 
2012). Therefore, it is crucial to examine the seven principles identified by Cooper and Edgett 
(2008) to increase NPD productivity through transformational/breakthrough innovation lens. 
 
Principle 1, VoC: 
There are mixed signals related to VoC and transformational type innovations. Veryzer (1998) 
speaks that in this kind of innovations, customer involvement is not beneficial as they cannot 
understand the proposed solutions because they break the natural chain of incremental product 
development. Study from Herstatt et al. (2008) does not support this. Their study indicated 
that customer needs were understood relatively well for this type of innovation, but translating 
those needs to technical language was insufficient. This indicates that a common problem 
may lie in the processes within the companies’ technical and marketing people rather than 
with the communication between the company and the customer. Herstatt et al. (2008) also 
suggest that hard numbers related to customers and markets are hard to estimate for this type 
of innovations. Bertels et al. (2013) suggest that the formalness of the business plan does not 
hold significant value for this type of innovations. However, they note that understanding the 
market is important factor for success for all types of innovation.  
To conclude all of this, it seems that VoC is an important factor also for transformational 
innovations. However, not all customer related activities have been proven beneficial. It seems 
that companies should try not to focus too much on quantifying the customers or the market in 
the early phases, and they maybe should not ask for concrete solutions suggestions from the 
customers who might think too narrowly. Rather they should try to understand what the 
customers might need, develop a solution for the need, and ask for feedback for the solution. 
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This kind of iterative learning approach has proven to be successful in breakthrough product 
development (Bertels et al. 2013) 
Principle 2, Front-end loaded homework: 
Many authors speak about the value of heavy front-end loaded early parts of the NPD process 
(Cooper 1998, Bertels et al. 2013, Herstatt et al. 2008, Veryzer 1998). Cooper (1998) stresses 
that both marketing and technical aspects are important in the front-end, and Herstatt et al 
(2008) say that technical and market uncertainty can be reduced with heavy front-end 
development. The front-end loaded process has been proven to be beneficial for both 
transformational type innovations and for incremental innovations (Herstatt et al. 2008). It 
seems to be more what the heavy early stages should be focused on for different types of 
innovations (Veryzer 1998, Bertels et al. 2013) rather than skipping the front-end for certain 
types of innovations. 
Bertels et al. (2013) studied what are the most important aspects for breakthrough and 
incremental products success in the front-end of the development. For breakthrough, they found 
that current market knowledge, white space disruptive market knowledge and idea enrichment 
using technology inventions were important for the success, meanwhile the formalness of the 
business plan was not critical factor in the success of breakthrough products. The three most 
important indicators of success for incremental products were current market knowledge, 
information system the company uses for sharing, capturing and building new ideas, and the 
formalness of the business plan. 
 
Principle 3, Spiral development: 
Cooper and Edgett (2008) suggest that integrating “build-test-feedback-and-revise” loops to the 
stage-gate model helps the companies to avoid launching products that are not already outdated. 
This seems to be especially so for transformational type innovations. Veryzer (1998) says that 
for discontinuous innovations prototyping comes usually much before than for incremental 
innovations. Herstatt et al. (2008) speak about prototyping as a tool to reduce technical and 
market uncertainties, and that the prototypes can be used in communication with different 
stakeholders. Sounders et al (1998) found that that higher perceived technical uncertainty leads 
to higher design change frequency in NPD projects. All this indicates that the riskier the project 
is, the more companies rely on these “build-test-feedback-and-revise” loops that Cooper and 
Edgett (2008) speak about. 
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Principle 4, Holistic approach, cross-functional teams: 
The idea of having cross-functional NPD teams is widely spoken in the academia and endorsed 
(e.g. Cooper and Edgett 2008, Troy et al. 2008, Dougherty 1992) but how this relates to 
transformational type innovations compared to other types of innovations has had less coverage. 
However, there are traces that could indicate that more high-tech and riskier projects, like 
transformational innovation projects, might benefit more from cross-functional teams than less 
risky projects. Sounders et al. (1998) speak about collaboration as a tool to reduce uncertainty, 
the higher the uncertainty is, the more need for collaboration there is. Troy et al. (2008) suggest 
that high-tech industries may benefit more from cross-functional integration than low-tech 
industries. This could suggest that high-tech projects would benefit more from cross-functional 
integration than low-tech projects.  
 
Principle 5, Metrics, accountable teams, continuous improvement and learning: 
The question of what metrics should be used to evaluate innovation projects depends on the 
type of project and the stage of the project. Hard financial numbers (Nagji and Tuff 2012) and 
market indicators (Herstatt et al. 2008) have been deemed to be poor at evaluating 
transformational type innovations, especially in the early stages. Similar to this, officialness of 
the business case in the front-end does not hold significant value for this type of innovations 
(Bertels et al. 2013). Nagji and Tuff (2012) propose using combination of non-financial and 
internal metrics, that would enable the organization to learn, to assess transformational efforts 
in the early stages.  
When thinking about measures more broadly in innovation context, what measures should be 
used to evaluate the whole innovation organization, similar shift away from mostly financial 
measures to incorporating also other factors seems to have gained popularity. Bremser and 
Barsky (2004) discuss linking organizations BSC to innovation functions BSC, and further to 
innovation units BSC. Stewart (2001) proposes conducting health checks to projects using more 
comprehensive BSC type approach compared to typical “on-time, on-budget” measures. This 
way companies would get better understanding on how individual projects benefit the whole 
organization, how well they are managed, how the management could improve (the project), 
and what is the strategy aspect of the project. However, measuring performance does not seem 
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to happen that well in practice. Hertenstein (2000) examined performance measures in NPD 
context and found many firms do not use any kind of measures for NPD performance explicitly. 
In the firms that did use, the link between the measures and company level strategy were 
preserved weak and further improvements in this area were requested by the surveyed NPD 
managers. Moreover, the managers were generally dissatisfied with the NPD performance 
measurement. 
 
Principle 6, Effective portfolio management: 
 
According to Cooper and Edgett (2008) formal processes to manage innovation project 
portfolios are rare even in best performing companies (31%) but still much more widely used 
than in poor performing companies (3.1%). Cooper et al. (1999) study also indicated that the 
companies that systematically use formal and explicit methods consistently for all projects in 
their innovation portfolio management have better performing portfolios. When it comes to 
methods that were used, using many different methods to evaluate innovation portfolio 
resulted in better project selection. Relying more on financial indicators like NPV and IRR 
resulted in poorly performing portfolios, meanwhile relying more on strategic approaches and 
scorecards resulted in the best performing portfolios. Sanchez and Robert (2010) argue that 
most of the indicators used are financial and schedule based, and more emphasis should be 
placed on strategic perspective and assessing the objectives of the project portfolio, and that 
companies should develop KPIs that take these into consideration and use them in the 
decision making.  
 
Principle 7, Next generation stage-gates: 
Cooper and Edgett (2008) say that stage-gate models are not one-size-fits-all solutions but they 
can be modified to different situations. They can be modified for example to encourage open 
innovation, to cater for different risk-level projects, or to enable automated gate decisions for 
some projects. Other studies also speak about modifications to stage-gate process (e.g. Cooper 
2009, Grönlund et al. 2010). The value of having flexibility in the stage-gate process can be 
seen from Cooper and Edgett (2012) study in which from the best performing companies 75% 
indicated having flexible stage-gate processes, meanwhile from the worst performers only 37% 
had such processes.  
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3 METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Research method and design 
This thesis is done following a constructive research approach (CRA). Kasanen et al. (1993) 
described CRA studies as studies that contribute to research by solving real life problems by 
building models, diagrams, plans etc. based on both academic literature and empirical data. 
This thesis builds a breakthrough innovation appraisal framework for a case company, and it 
also identifies other possible issues in the innovation context at the case company. The 
construct, meaning the breakthrough innovation appraisal framework, is the main object and 
contribution of the study so the study fits to CRA description.  
Malmi (2016) defines managerialist studies in management accounting as “studies in which at 
least one of the aims is to directly support or help, in one way or another, organizational 
decision-making and control.” He further divides managerialist research in management 
accounting to interventionist and non-interventionist studies, and he divides interventionist 
studies to action research and to studies applying constructive approach. The main difference 
between the two is in the objectives of the studies. In constructive approach the aim is to create 
a “theoretically novel and managerially helpful” construct and the construct itself is the 
intended contribution, whereas in action research the main objective is to develop a deep 
understanding of various forces in the case organization by participating and to theorize based 
on those insights. He further explains that from the theoretical standpoint, it is crucial that the 
constructive solution contains some conceptually or theoretically novel aspects, just applying 
existing tools and frameworks does not qualify as scientific research. 
Kasanen et al. (1993) divided the CRA process to six phases, the order of the phases may vary 
from case to case: 
1. Find a practically relevant problem which also has research potential. 
2. Obtain a general and comprehensive understanding of the topic.  
3. Innovate, i.e., construct a solution idea.  
4. Demonstrate that the solution works. 
5. Show the theoretical connections and the research contribution of the solution concept.  
6. Examine the scope of applicability of the solution 
 
Baard (2010) speaks about the validity and reliability of interventionist research (IR), which 
includes CRA studies. He says that for CRA studies, using the six-phase framework by Kasanen 
et al. (1993), or similar six-phase framework by Labro and Tuomela (2003), facilitates critical 
assessment and verification of the phases and steps related to the construct development, which 
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increase the validity and reliability of the construct itself. See table 3 for how the six phases of 
CRA were handled in this thesis. 
Rautiainen et al. (2017) say that the success and the validity of the CRA are mainly assessed 
based on the practical relevance of the construct in the case organization and beyond it. They 
discuss how “market tests” have been used to describe the practical relevance of the constructs 
created in the CRA process as follow: 
• Weak market test: the construct is adopted to use in the case organization 
• Semi-strong market test: the construct is adopted also in other organizations / Rautiainen 
et al. (2017) alternative for this is proof of financial value to the case organization, where 
managerial perceptions may serve as an indicator of the expected benefits to the 
construct. 
• Strong market test: financial benefits of the use of the construct apply to multiple 
businesses 
 
However, other authors like Kasanen et al. (1993) have slightly more lenient view on the weak 
market test, describing the weak market test passed if any manager responsible for the financial 
results of his business unit has been willing to apply the construction in his decision making. 
They also note that even this weak market test is quite strict, and that tentative constructions 
cannot often pass it, iterating the construct with the case company is often required.  
Rautiainen et al. (2017) note that the relevance of the construct is hard to measure, e.g. if the 
case organization adopts the construct and soon abandons it, and the adoption of the construct 
does not automatically mean that the construct is of high quality. If the developed construct is 
of high quality, the case organization might block the authors to share the construct, and semi-
strong and strong market tests cannot be conducted. Also, analysing the contribution of the 
construct only from the market test perspective does not take into consideration the academic 
relevance of the construct. They suggest that the relevance of the construct could be analysed 
from several perspectives, analysing its potential relevance and the relevance over time. 
Therefore, the validity of this thesis also from other perspectives was kept in mind throughout 
the process. This was done by answering how the six phases of CRA by Kasanen et al. (1993) 
were handled in this research. This is summarized in the table 3 below. 
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Kasanen et al. (1993) six phases of CRA How this was this step handled in the 
research 
1. Find a practically relevant problem which 
also has research potential 
The author approached case company with a 
raw idea. The Idea was developed further 
together with the case company so that it had 
both business and academic potential. 
2. Obtain a general and comprehensive 
understanding of the topic 
Literature review, interviews at the case 
company, through informal discussion with 
different stakeholders at the company, and by 
studying benchmark companies  
3. Innovate, i.e., construct a solution idea  Iterating together with the case company 
throughout the process 
4. Demonstrate that the solution works 
 
The case company will adopt a separate track to 
assess breakthrough innovations where some 
but not all of the of the aspects proposed by this 
thesis will be used. Process unification for 
breakthrough innovations will be part of said 
evaluation. The tier 2 issues received positive 
response but when and if any of these issues are 
discussed in more detail at the case company is 
not known at this point. 
5. Show the theoretical connections and 
the research contribution of the solution 
concept 
The construct was built based on both empirical 
findings and existing literature. Answer to 
Davila (2005) call for further research on how to 
structure the control process to get radical 
innovations to emerge and prosper. 
6. Examine the scope of applicability of the 
solution 
The scope of applicability for other 
organizations is not in the scope of this thesis.  
 
3.1.1 Interviews 
The data in this thesis was gathered mostly by interviewing different stakeholders at the 
company. The total number of interviews was 6, and the total number of interviewees was 7, 
meaning one of the interviews had two people participating in it. Table 4 below for the full list 
of interviewees and their positions in the company.  
 
 
 
Table 3: How the six phases of CRA were handled in the research 
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Role Division Date Time 
Director A 19.2.2019 1.06 
Vice President B 21.2.2019 1.09 
Specialist B 21.2.2019 1.09 
Head of Innovation C 7.3.2019 0.58 
Director Group Innovation and R&D 13.3.2019 1.06 
Manager D 14.3.2019 0.58 
Director E 15.3.2019 1.22 
The Case organization has decentralized innovation structure, meaning that different divisions 
have their own innovation functions. In addition to this, the company has group-wide 
“Innovation and R&D” function to supports innovation on company level, for example by 
financing projects that benefited more than one of the divisions. In this thesis people from five 
of those divisions were interviewed, and one person from the group-wide “Innovation and 
R&D” was interviewed. The interviewees held a varying set of roles at divisions’ innovation 
functions, but they were all either the head of innovation of the division or the person(s) 
proposed by the head of innovation of the division. The people interviewed that were not the 
heads of innovations of their division had a strong role in the innovation process development 
of their division. 
The interviews were semi-structured, meaning that the question sheet formed a base for the 
interview but also other interesting topics that arose during the interview were discussed. The 
interviewees received the question sheet at least two days prior to the interview to give them 
time to prepare. The question sheets varied based on the role and the division of the interviewee, 
and based on the issues raised in the previous interviews. The average length of the interviews 
was 1h and 6 minutes. All the interviews were recorded and transcribed. The answers of the 
interviewees were structured under questions in their question sheets. Finally, the answers of 
the questions that were comparable among different interviews were compared. See appendix 
1 for question sheet used in one of the interviews 
3.1.2 Other sources of data 
Other sources of data include process description documentation (PowerPoint and Word) 
provided by the divisions’ innovation teams and Group Innovation and R&D. Reporting 
templates (PowerPoint) used at different divisions were also examined. The detail of the process 
Table 4: List of interviewees 
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description documents varied, some of the divisions provided PowerPoint presentations that 
were close to hundred slides and some were around dozen slides.  
The author of the thesis was located at the case company, in the group-wide Innovation and 
R&D function, and the unofficial communication with the Innovation and R&D team helped to 
grasp the nature of the problem and provided clues where the potential pitfalls of the current 
processes may lie. This was especially so in the beginning of the project, when the problem that 
had both academic and practical potential was identified. 
3.1.3 Triangulation and limiting factors 
Pauwels and Matthyssens (2004) say that “Triangulation aims at the integration of multiple data 
sources in a multi-method design”. The idea behind triangulation is that the weaknesses in 
single data collection source or method are compensated by counter-balancing strengths of 
other methods or sources (Jick 1979). Pauwels and Matthyssens (2004) say that triangulation 
can be accomplished in many ways. This can be for example interviewing various respondents 
on the same topic (synchronic primary data source triangulation), interviewing the same 
responded on the same topic more than once (diachronic primary data source triangulation), or 
by combining primary and secondary data sources. 
In this thesis, the primary data source was the conducted interviews, and the secondary data 
sources were process description documentation and reporting templates. Synchronic primary 
data source triangulation happened as the interviews had mostly the same topics, different 
perspectives to the same problem were gathered in the interviews.  
When it comes to the limiting factors, the amount of people interviewed from each division 
raises a question, are the found issues truly reflecting the overall situation at the division or are 
they merely a view that the single person (or in one case two persons) who was interviewed 
has? Another point to consider is that the innovation environment at the case company is very 
complex, all the divisions have their own innovation functions, and on top of that group has its 
own function to support innovation on a company level. Truly understanding the whole 
innovation environment in five months this thesis was written is a huge task, and it might be 
that some aspects were not noted enough. 
Another limiting factor is related to core innovations. In the interviews the roles and challenges 
of breakthrough innovations were discussed in comparison to adjacent innovations. Core 
innovations were part of the question sheets but somehow, they were almost always left out of 
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the discussion in the actual interviews. Almost all the interviewees focused on the difference 
between breakthrough and adjacent innovations. Therefore, when it comes to the unique 
characteristics of breakthrough and adjacent innovations, there is credibility in the findings, but 
when it comes to core innovations this thesis will not make any grand claims.  
Finally, there is the aspect of insider action research (IRA), which means doing research in your 
own organization (Coghlan & Holian 2007). In IRA studies a member of an organization takes 
a researcher role in addition to the functional role they hold in organization. This dual role may 
cause challenges for the researcher. First, the researcher needs to further draw closer to the 
organization and the phenomena he is studying, and at the same time try to distance himself to 
see things critically. The second challenge relates to the dual role as a researcher and as an 
organizational member, which may cause role confusion, role conflict or role overload. The 
third challenge is related to organizational politics. This may cause the researcher to balance 
between his future career plans at the organization with the requirements and quality of his 
academic research, “failed” organizational research problem may still be an excellent academic 
thesis, while at the same time it could limit the career opportunities of the researcher. (Coghlan 
& Holian 2007). 
The writer of this thesis was on the payroll of the company but he did not hold any other 
functional role at the organization. Still, some of the challenges listed by Coghlan and Holian 
(2007) may apply to this thesis also.  
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4 CASE COMPANY AND FINDINGS 
4.1 Case Introduction 
4.1.1 Case company organization 
The case company is a large forestry company based in Finland. The company has had to 
transform in recent years as the demand for paper has shrunk substantially and new demand has 
emerged for wood based products in other segments. The company has a strong desire to further 
increase the share of sales of new products as of the total sales of the company. The company 
has defined three groups of innovations, breakthrough, adjacent and core, that are closely a like 
with Nagji’s and Tuff’s (2012) definitions of three types of innovation (see table 5). The 
company wants to increase the share of breakthrough innovations. This thesis is written to 
support this initiative. 
 
 
The case company has a divisional structure. In this thesis 5 of those divisions and group-wide 
“Group Innovation and R&D” were interviewed. The divisions are referred as division A, B, 
C, D, E to avoid revealing the identity of the case company. Innovation and R&D structure at 
the company is decentralized, all the divisions have their own innovation and R&D functions. 
To harvest possible synergies between the different divisions, the company had established a 
separate “Group Innovation and R&D” function that finances and screens innovation projects 
that benefit more than one of the divisions.  
Table 5: Transformational / breakthrough, adjacent and core innovation definitions 
 Transformational 
/Breakthrough 
Innovation 
Adjacent Innovation Core Innovation 
Nagji and Tuff 
(2012) 
Developing 
breakthroughs and 
inventing things for 
markets that do not yet 
exist 
Expanding from existing 
business into “new to 
the company” business 
Optimizing existing 
products for existing 
customers 
 
Case Company Developing completely 
new products for new 
customer segments  
Further developing 
existing products 
to current customer 
needs  
Efficiency in existing 
production processes  
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The divisions’ innovation functions are vastly different in resources, some of them have a few 
dozen people working in them and some of them have more than a hundred. This factor was 
something that the divisions with smaller resources emphasized during the interview process. 
It also affects the needs, or at least perceived needs, for the framework used in innovation 
appraisal. Generally speaking, the divisions with higher resources had more complex and more 
detailed processes and used more templates than the divisions with smaller resources.  
Another factor that affected the innovation processes at the divisions was the type of innovation 
they were conducting. One differentiator was how customer driven their R&D and innovation 
efforts were versus how R&D driven they were. Another differentiator was that the divisions 
had significantly different shares of breakthrough innovations in their innovation portfolio. 
These two factors affected two of the interviewed divisions the most. Division D has higher 
level of customer involvement in their innovation process than the other divisions, and division 
E has modified their innovation process to cater for breakthrough as they have around 90% 
breakthrough innovations in their portfolio, compared to less than 20% in other divisions.  
4.1.2 Innovation stage-gate model 
All the interviewed divisions and the group-wide Innovation and R&D follow a stage-gate 
model in their innovation processes. The stage-gate models differ slightly from each other due 
to the “unique nature” (e.g. resources, different levels of uncertainty in the innovation context, 
type of business…) of the divisions. The go / no-go decisions are made at each gate, where 
among other issues, the business plans and project specific KPIs are discussed.  
The stage-gate models differ in at least five ways:  
1. Terminology of the stages  
2. Number of stages in the model 
3. Described objectives of the stages 
4. Required documents at the gates 
5. Governance models / decision bodies making the go or no-go decisions 
At the case company, there has been an attempt to unify the innovation processes some years 
ago. The divisions came together and developed a one-size-fits-all stage-gate model that was 
adopted in all the divisions. However, the constructed stage-gate model had a lifetime of a few 
weeks, with different divisions doing different modifications to the framework to better suit 
their needs. Director from Division A describes those events, and challenges of having one 
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framework that all the divisions would follow. He said the following when asked about the 
biggest challenges of having one framework for all the divisions: 
 
“We have in practice established this X years ago, one stage-gate model for 
innovation and research projects in the company. There was a workshop with head of 
innovations from the different divisions… there is a benefit to have one system for all 
divisions but the biggest challenge is that every small division, every big division, 
might have a different aspect and this needs to be reflected. And it is completely 
difficult, or it was in those days very difficult, to redefine one stage-gate model. We 
finally made it, but it had a lifetime of weeks.” 
4.1.3 Decision making processes, forums and stakeholders 
The innovation and R&D projects have multiple key stakeholders. Each project has: 
• Project steering group: comprises of multiple senior decision makers. Responsible for 
steering the project to desired outcome and making go/no-go/hold decisions at the gates. 
• Project manager: responsible for operational management of the project and reporting 
to the steering group. 
• Project owner: responsible for monitoring the project, who is also a member in the 
steering group. 
In addition to these, there are senior executives at division and company levels: 
• Head of innovation: responsible for his/her division’s innovation, one in each division 
• Chief of Strategy: responsible for innovation on the company level 
Moreover, the divisions had different division specific structures to assess innovation or sub-
sections of innovation. These structures could be called for example flagship programs or 
innovation portfolio meetings.  
4.2 Unique nature of breakthrough innovation 
In the interviews breakthrough innovations were seen as quite different from adjacent and core 
innovations. They were seen as significantly riskier projects that needed a different perspective 
when assessed. However, it is fair to note that the interview questions were built to emphasize 
the unique nature of the breakthrough innovations, defining the different types of innovation 
(breakthrough/adjacent/core) in the beginning of the question sheet, asking questions how 
something affects different types of innovation, and dedicating a whole sub-section in the 
interview for breakthrough innovation related questions. See Appendix 1 for an example 
question sheet that was used in one of the interviews. Also, the topic of comparing breakthrough 
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innovations to adjacent and core innovations was active in the company before the thesis was 
conducted, and this terminological division to breakthrough/adjacent/core innovations was 
widely used. 
Division B Vice President, when asked about what is hard when assessing breakthrough 
innovations compared to adjacent and core innovations: 
“I think adjacent and core innovation, it is probably easier to predict the outcome and 
the potential market value as such and the potential success and the money related to 
it. But when you are in breakthrough innovation, as you are in completely new ground, 
you don’t necessarily have or cannot gather all the figures to have absolute numbers or 
figures to estimate the success and the money related to it because you might be 
inventing something that doesn’t even exist yet. So, in a way the risk involved in 
breakthrough innovations, in my mind, is always higher, and thus it requires you to take 
decisions with higher risk and uncertainty.” 
Other interviewees also emphasized this riskiness of breakthroughs and that they are harder to 
estimate as you are in new area to the company. A couple of the interviewees even spoke about 
gut feeling when it comes to assessing breakthrough innovations, for example, director from 
Group Innovation and R&D said the following about breakthrough innovations: 
“I think breakthrough innovation needs to be treated as it is. If you come up with 
something completely new, and you are supposed to estimate the market… you can look 
at reference products but how does your reference, your project idea stack up to the 
reference product… do you feel comfortable to bet on that idea vis-à-vis other ideas. 
Whether you shelf it until it becomes more certain. I think there is no silver bullet to 
selecting the key projects that you will take from ideation into concept. I think there is 
one portion that is based on facts and there is at least a portion that kind of comes with 
gut feeling or anticipation. Because you don’t, you just don’t have enough information at 
that particular point in time but you still need to make the decision.” 
4.3 The seven principles of successful innovation in the case company 
context 
In the next sub-sections the seven principles identified by Cooper and Edgett (2008) are gone 
through from the perspective of the interviews. It is important to note that the interviewer / 
author of the thesis did not push any of the seven principles to be the topic in the interviews, in 
fact he only read about the seven principles after conducting the interviews. Therefore, all the 
discussion related to the seven principles with the divisions’ top level innovation managers 
occurred naturally when discussing about other factors, e.g. what is hard when assessing 
breakthrough innovations or how do they handle prioritization of projects.  
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4.3.1 Customer focused with voice of customer work 
One aspect that became evident during the interviews was that the interviewees saw that 
listening to the voice of the customer (VoC) was seen as extremely important, especially in the 
beginning of the process and for breakthrough innovations. The reasoning behind was that if 
they were expanding to new markets to the company or new markets to the world, there will be 
a significant risk related to the market and the customers. There is a risk of not understanding 
that the market is not real for the developed technology that is otherwise working well, that the 
customers are interested in the technology but with modifications, or that they are not willing 
to pay enough to cover the costs. These aspects were seen as less important in adjacent and core 
innovations, where the company already has market experience. 
Taking the customer perspective better into consideration was seen as an area where the case 
company could improve. Also, some of the divisions saw this as an area that they needed to 
improve. Director from division E said the following when asked about what he would do 
differently if he would design the whole framework from the scratch: 
 
“One thing that I would start differently, and I think that’s where we have tried to 
improve this year, is especially in these early stages, idea stage, idea scoping stage or 
the stage 1 that we call idea fit, I think I would focus more on understanding customer 
value propositions and bring this customer or consumer perspective more than 
anything else. So, put a more focus, more emphasis on that aspect, and less in 
everything else.” 
 
Division D had just last year built a complete “commercialization framework” to run with the 
stage-gate model to tackle this problem of not losing the customer focus and keeping the 
commercialization aspect also in mind. The commercialization framework has been in use for 
a short time, but so far it seems to have a significant impact on this division´s NPD success. 
The commercialization framework is almost like a second stage-gate model running as an 
interlinked whole with the stage-gate framework at that division. Commercialization 
framework emphasizes also working or iterating together with the customer. Like the stage-
gate model, the commercialization framework follows the stages of the stage-gate model, it 
has detailed set of deliverables and questions needed to be answered at each stage. 
When asked about the strength of their stage-gate model, the manager who was developing 
the commercialization framework, said the following: 
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“I think the main strength is that we have added a commercialization lens to it, so that 
not only the sort of company overall innovation stage-gate model is followed but we 
also think how to commercialize innovations from the very beginning.” 
 
When he was asked to further explain what the commercialization framework is he explained: 
 
“I think it started out with us looking at the innovation stage-gate model and sort of 
lacking a more commercial aspect to it. I mean in theory a lot of it is in place there 
(stage-gate model) but in practice what we actually have is supportive tools and 
templates to actually run sort of successful launches of innovations… We (at division 
D) can have quite short innovation cycles on product category X, so to develop 
product X doesn’t always necessarily cost that much in investment but you need to 
think about the logic from a customer perspective, so to really work with the customer 
insights early on making sure that you get a good value proposition and how to 
actually sell it to a customer in the end and get that in quite early in the innovation 
process to not develop things that aren’t sort of valid in the market or that there exists 
a market basically.” 
 
When asked if the commercialization framework should be adopted in other divisions as well 
he was not quite sure if it would fit the structures of the other divisions. The key strength in 
their division’s innovation setup seemed to be that the sales and commercialization function is 
strongly linked with the innovation function. When discussing about the challenges of having 
the same or similar innovation processes between the different divisions he said: 
“I think the biggest difference we have is how R&D heavy it is versus how 
commercially, how much is focused on commercialization and how much is focused on 
R&D. And I think for many of our divisions it’s very long cycles, it’s R&D heavy, it’s 
intense in these sort of first parts that can span for years, and for others that is a quick 
thing and it’s more focused on how do we actually execute and get money from 
innovations. So, I think that’s the biggest challenge, that the business logic is quite 
different in different divisions.” 
 
Later in the interview he mentioned that the logic behind the stage-gate structure should 
probably come more from the customer side, divisions that have the same kind of customers 
could have more similar stage-gate models. 
Director from division A had an interesting point related to the customers and innovation 
setups. He mentioned that overall the company is doing innovation activities too far away 
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from the customers. This topic came up when discussing about a completely different topic, 
how he sees the role of Group Innovation and R&D. 
“We are very very much northern hemisphere centric. So, we have main focus in 
resources in Finland and Sweden but we have only minor amounts of customers in 
Finland and Sweden. All our customers are sitting more in central Europe or sitting in 
Asia, and we are not actually allocating research and innovation resources to those 
kinds of markets where our customers are active. This is a miss-match, a strong miss-
match.” 
 
 
Later he continued about the same topic 
 
“We should be more focusing on where our customers are because if we could run 
research projects together with our customers for sure we would be much closer and 
much more successful in entering to new market segment and to new technologies, 
which are that customer driven and (that) customer relevant.” 
 
4.3.2 Heavy-front-end loaded homework before development begins 
Many of the interviewees saw that in breakthrough innovations a lot more time should be spent 
in the beginning of the process. Some indicated that they might have started projects too easily 
and this could be avoided with more comprehensive homework. 
Heavy front-end-loaded homework was especially seen important for breakthrough innovations 
as the risks related to them were seen as higher than for adjacent and core innovations. One of 
the interviewees even suggested an “express stage-gate” for adjacent innovations skipping or 
gliding through some stages, the reasoning being that if you already know the market, if you 
already know the inputs for detailed financial calculations there is no reason to stay in the early 
parts as long as for breakthrough innovations. 
Division C head of innovation said the following when asked if he thinks it is smart to follow 
the same stage-gate model for all innovation projects: 
“…The other thing that I would say is important is that in the breakthrough 
innovations… you would probably need to spend more time in the first parts of the 
process rather than in the last ones. Because a lot of the testing a lot of the will this 
work or won’t it work and so on will be discussed in the first parts of the process, while 
in the adjacent innovation a lot is already known… I would probably have different type 
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of processes for different types of innovations, OR I would have the same one while 
doing adjacent innovation I would skip a couple of areas.” 
 
A bit similarly to this, division E director said the following when asked would he use the same 
framework for breakthrough, adjacent and core projects: 
 
“When you are talking about core or adjacent you can have express stage-gate, 
maybe this is the name I’m going to call it, express stage-gate so, eventually you don’t 
need to create new material in the lab and scale up to a small pilot, eventually you are 
adding features for an existing product that you can already pilot in a larger scale one 
step before launch for a commercial scale. So, you can skip some of those scale-up 
stages. But I would say that the thinking behind still is the same: You need to be 
addressing customer need, you need to understand your value proposition, you need to 
understand the market etc. all those things. If you already know wonderful, you just 
check the box, but you need to go through you know because otherwise you take the 
risk again to develop something that you eventually find out nobody wants.” 
 
Third example of the importance of the early stages comes from the director from Group 
Innovation and R&D. He said the following when asked about if he would modify the stage-
gate model for breakthroughs: 
 
“I think the stages would look slightly different but I think the ideation to concept, 
concept creation and proof of concept, will be a lot more iterative and from a time 
perspective that stage would be prolonged. And I think as you are coming to more of 
defining that concept I think then feasibility would be a lot easier. Then you kind of 
tag into the feasibility as it is today.”  
 
Further question about where he would focus in this “prolonged” early stage was asked and he 
answered: 
“I think typically for breakthrough you would really like to partner up with someone. 
Someone that is in that industry or adjacent industries, and that kind of trial and error 
if it’s (with) the end customer… … that iterative work will be most important. And at 
the same time, yes you will look at the market research, yes you will look at the true 
customer need. But I think it is a lot about taking kind of wild idea into something that 
you haven’t even thought about and that will happen through iterative trial and error 
process.” 
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4.3.3 Spiral development – information loops with users through-out the development 
process 
Information loops were seen as important factor where the company or the division could 
improve. These loops were especially related to the early parts of the stage-gate process. Also, 
some sort of loops usually came to the discussion when speaking about breakthrough 
innovations and their needs as can be seen from the section 4.3.2 (p.45 head of innovation 
division C, p. 46 director group innovation) above. Information loops with the customers were 
also a part of commercialization framework (p. 43-44). Another interesting point to note is that 
the loops usually came into discussion when speaking about the early parts of the breakthrough 
innovation assessment, and when asked about what the iterative first stages would include, the 
customer perspective came into discussion. The first three principles are strongly interlinked. 
Answer from the director from division E to a question, what is the weakness of the stage-gate 
model they use highlights this interlinkage perfectly: 
 
“So the weaknesses is especially when you are dealing with breakthrough type of 
projects which is the majority in our portfolio for division E, the early stages, the 
early stage before you have a product definition or when you are still trying to find out 
exactly what will be fit for a customer, it’s a lot of uncertainty as such, and therefore 
you need a lot of interaction in this process both with the customer, iterating with the 
customer to find out exactly what is needed and what is valuable for the customer, but 
also in the technology side, iterating, prototyping to see if we can make something. 
And these initial stages they are not a linear processes they are quite iterative, think 
about like a circular picture where you test something and then you validate with the 
customer or not and you get feedback and then you come back and you prototype 
again and you have this loop until you get to a point that okay, we have identified 
something that is valuable for the customer that eventually we think we can make 
money for us, but that we also have confidence that we can develop... So this very 
early stage is not linear as I said, it’s very iterative and so the stage-gate doesn’t 
really address that. If you think about only using the stage-gate for that we would end 
up in very linear process and this can take much more longer to work.”  
 
Other divisions spoke also about the iterative nature, testing, or loops when breakthroughs came 
to discussion. For example, specialist from the division B said the following when asked about 
if he would modify the stage-gate model for breakthrough innovations:  
 
“We divide the innovation… we have these strategic projects (includes breakthrough) 
that are longer… with bigger budgets (than) the product development projects. So, we 
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have the same stage-gate model for this too but it doesn’t have so structured and so 
well established process description than in the product development side. So yeah, I 
would do that completely out, do that completely out from scratch and focus more on 
the iterative part on the projects than following the stage-gate funnel like it is always 
presented… even though it is good to have the gates still to be able to say that okay 
this project is going at this stage now. But it should be kind of loop more than a pipe 
for the breakthrough ones, and for the strategic ones.” 
 
4.3.4 Holistic approach driven by effective cross-functional teams 
The topic of team composition did not really arise during the interviews. However, there were 
some traces to be found that one area that could be developed further regarding teams in 
innovation functions was the role of sales and marketing perspective. Director from Group 
Innovation and R&D function said the following when asked if there are any cross divisional 
problems in the innovation process: 
 
“I think problems will typically not lie in the model itself. It has more to do with 
availability of resources. By that I mean for instance having enough project leaders... 
That becomes a bottle neck, and I think the amount of marketing intelligence is 
another bottle neck that typically slows down the process.” 
 
Another trace from this came from division E: 
“In our case we have a very strong R&D team, a lot of technical people, very 
specialized, a lot of PhDs and etc. We don’t have yet too much of the marketing 
people…” 
On the other hand, division D had sales and commercialization strongly linked with the 
innovation function. Moreover, the topic did not arise at all in some of the interviews. 
Explanation for this is that it was not specifically asked in any of the interviews. Therefore, it 
is hard to make any sort of judgements based on the limited discussion on the topic. 
 
4.3.5 Metrics, accountable teams & continuous improvement through post launch reviews 
and continuous learning. 
For breakthrough innovations, the role of financial indicators in the beginning of the process, 
was seen as it should not be that important. In the beginning other aspects of the project such 
as strategic importance, customer perspective and learning potential were seen as important. 
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The reasoning behind is that there are so many unknowns, and that the estimates would be 
wrong anyway. Some of the interviewees rather spoke about “potentials” and “orders of 
magnitude” The view was that the role of financial indicators should increase as acquired 
information increases throughout the process. 
When asked would he treat the KPIs for breakthrough innovations differently than for adjacent 
or core innovations, division E director highlighted other aspects than hard figures: 
 
“Yes, and that is what we were trying to do especially in the early stages since you 
don’t know a lot of things, it’s so uncertain, you cannot handle the same way…  it’s 
less financial, it’s less accounting, it’s much more about other aspects, it’s about 
understanding the strategic importance of the project and understanding future 
potential in terms of markets of learning, understanding if we can differentiate 
ourselves in the market to understand what is the business case for the customer with 
this opportunity, understand what type of business models we can operate with, what 
is the market attractiveness, if it’s a growing market or if it’s not, what is the 
competitive landscape. So, a lot of, hundreds of aspects that you try to evaluate to 
come up with this conclusion okay this makes sense for us to continue or not.”  
 
When it came to using financial figures in the beginning he spoke about using ranges at this 
early stage and avoiding pinpointing exact numbers that were deemed to be wrong anyway. 
“At the end of the day they will of course have a financial impact but at this very early 
stages it’s very hard to pinpoint, so I prefer to work with potentials and trying to work 
when required to have some order of magnitude in terms of the financial, then I work 
with ranges, ranges for the sales, ranges for the profitability, range for the NPVs of 
the business case. But I avoid, or try to avoid at least, pinpointing this NPV is 122 and 
the other one is 127 when by the end of the day we know that it’s wrong at this stage 
you know.” 
 
However, as the project progresses, more information is gathered to support financial 
calculations. This way the detail in the calculations, and the value of the calculations increases 
later in the process. When asked if the financial calculations are made in more detail in the later 
stages he responded: 
“Exactly, so as you scale up, as you go further in the funnel I would say that this detail 
in calculation increases because of what happens is that a lot of the assumptions you 
were now learning and proving, and as you learn more then you refresh the business 
case, you update the calculations and you have more aggregated view.” 
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Director from Group Innovation and R&D responded similarly to the question “How do you 
see the role of financial indicators when assessing breakthrough innovations?”: 
 
“It’s a way of coping with the uncertainty. And I think it’s wrong. The financial 
indicators are lagging indicators. And if we talk about this great level of uncertainty, 
financial indicators should be treated very carefully because there is huge caveat to 
most of the numbers that it depends on this, it depends on that, it is assumption of this 
or assumption of that... I would most likely push for customer, market indicators, 
technical indicators until you come to a point where the idea is as it would be a product 
ready to move forward with, when you have most of that information collected and 
analyzed. Then you can look at the financial indicators… the best way to kill a 
breakthrough innovation is to stamp financial indicators on top of it.” 
 
 
The head of innovation from division C had similar thoughts regarding the role of financial 
indicators, that their importance should be greater at the later stages of breakthrough 
innovations, and at the beginning other metrics could be more important. He proposed 
focusing on different metrics in different stages of breakthrough development. 
 
“Well when you proceed it’s of course the financial figures. But before you have all 
these financial figures the KPIs should be you know, how many customers have you 
interviewed, how many customer meetings have you had in regards to this potential 
(project) or whatever. More of quantitative things that to gather the information 
rather than what would the financial impact be. Financial impact would definitely 
come but that would come at a later stage in my mind” 
 
A bit similarly to this, vice president from the division B described being more flexible with 
the financial indicators in breakthrough innovations in order to let the projects “fly” and not kill 
them too early. The metrics might be the same, but the way you treat them differs. When asked 
about does the nature (metrics and the way they are used) of KPIs differ for breakthrough 
innovations compared to adjacent and core she responded: 
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“This is a valid point because we know that for example the KPIs are the same, but the 
way that the KPIs are treated might be different… if we talk about breakthrough, we 
take the risk, we understand that this is something that will come… So even if we follow 
these KPIs, we need to understand that this something we want to foster, we believe in 
it, meaning that it might take a bit more to achieve the profitability figures that we have 
been expecting but you are treated differently due to the fact that it is breakthrough and 
maybe the risk taking is different.” 
 
She later continued about similar topic, when asked about the role of financial indicators in 
assessing breakthrough innovations: 
 
“You need to be able to accept higher level of risk maybe be a little bit be more flexible 
in what comes to the expected financial indicators or rates of return. Because otherwise 
if you go by the corporate standards, which are meant for.. for basically for core 
innovations or whatever, you will end up killing project before it has the chance to fly” 
 
This previously mentioned difficulty of dealing with uncertainty and doing decision based on 
limited information, especially financial, was something that many of the interviewees 
mentioned as a challenge when assessing breakthrough innovations. However, it might be that 
this view is not shared with everybody at the company, and there might be a block in the 
company who might not want to cope with this uncertainty. Division C head of innovation said 
the following when asked about what is hard in breakthrough innovations compared to adjacent 
and core: 
 
“I would say the unknown is so much bigger in the breakthrough... and in a company 
like we are with a lot of controllers everywhere, I mean my boss is a former controller 
for instance, it’s figures and facts that rule, and if you don’t have those figures and 
facts you don’t know the true market, you don’t know how big portion of the total 
market is available and those things. It is the unknown, and being able to take a 
decision based on, I wouldn’t say a gut feeling, but closer to gut feeling than it is in 
these adjacent innovation projects. “ 
 
In the table 6 below thoughts about using financial indicators in breakthrough assessment are 
gathered. 
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Division The role of financial indicators when assessing breakthroughs 
A The role seems to be high from the beginning of the project until the end 
B Harder to estimate for breakthrough innovations, so need for flexibility when 
assessing financial numbers. In the early stages of process needs to be given enough 
room to grow. 
C The role of financial indicators should be small in the beginning, and increase in later 
stages. The role of customer related indicators should be higher in the early stages. 
D Did not specifically answer to the question 
E In the beginning, it is more about other aspects than financial, e.g. strategy, learning 
potential, possibility for differentiation. Prefers to work with orders of magnitude and 
potentials in the beginning. The detail and importance of financials would increase 
as the project moves forward. 
Group 
Innovation 
and R&D 
The role of financial indicators is exaggerated currently. In the beginning customer, 
market and technical indicators should have more importance, and as you gather 
more information the financial calculations should be made in more detail 
 
The KPIs seem to have more communicative / learning role in some of the divisions. A couple 
of division mentioned that the KPIs are used to find root causes for the problems if they are 
short of their target values. For example, at division B, they follow KPIs against targets. The 
vice president answered the following when asked about how they react if they do not achieve 
the targets: 
“So, then we do… root cause analysis... if the KPIs are not there (close to the target 
values) then of course those are discussed in the monthly meetings, that first of all why 
are we delayed in the KPI and what is the issue… R&D’s having their monthly 
management meeting where the KPIs gone through and then follow them up.” 
 
At division B, they follow project specific KPIs with traffic lights, with green meaning all 
good, yellow meaning slight deviation and red high deviation from the target. Some project 
specific KPIs are for example outcome, cost, schedule, resources and business case based 
measures. In addition to these project specific KPIs, that are used to identify possible project 
level problems, division B also has portfolio level KPIs that are used to monitor the whole 
innovation portfolio, and they are used in similar manner (comparing against target values). 
These include KPIs like sales of new products and services, and lead times between gates.  
 
Table 6: Role of financial indicators when assessing breakthroughs 
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The learning aspect of projects came into discussion in other areas than project KPIs as well. 
When asked about what are the most important factors when assessing breakthrough 
innovations, director from division E brought up, among other things, the fact that many of 
them fail, but there is a learning aspect even in the failed projects. 
“Most important factors. I think it’s what I said, it’s about strategic fit if this fits on 
what we are trying to do as a company and as a division, that is first. If there is 
market potential in here you can draw different things like what is the value 
proposition, what is the differentiation for the customer, what is the size of this market 
and the growth to understand if this is interesting or not to pursue. Then you need to 
evaluate the technical capability, meaning do we have already the skills, do we 
already have the capability to develop this technology or this product… And then 
finally maybe is the learning potential in the initiative, not everything that we do in 
breakthrough will go through all the stages on the contrary, right? The hit rate is I 
don’t know, one to I don’t know, one to eight, maybe. One to ten, I don’t know in the 
markets out there, meaning just a few of the products will really come through all the 
way but in a lot of those you learn as you go and this will help us to make the other 
projects come through. And that is also how we try to evaluate a bit, what is the 
learning potential of each project.”  
 
Director from Group Innovation and R&D brought up the same thing, learning aspects of all 
projects, even the killed ones. His response when asked about killing projects, if the company 
is doing it enough: 
 
“I’m not so concerned about killing projects, I’m more concerned about how do we 
document. Because there is learning in all projects. How do we systematically capture 
and catalog the learnings and make them available to our own research and 
development community? So there is organizational learning for all the projects.” 
 
Next, he was asked if this documenting should be done with a post-project review or 
continuously throughout the project: 
“I think If it is not done, some do it some don’t, that there should be a log kept by the 
project leader where the research findings are logged as they appear. So, it’s not only 
when you summarize the project, you might miss some of the findings that you learned 
along the road. Kind of come to the conclusion at the end, go back to your level one 
hypothesis and you say well it did work, what did not work because of, but there was a 
lot of learnings in between, how do you make sure to capture those because they can 
be the next one, the next trigger for an adjacent innovation. I mean take 3M for 
instance and this post-it story, the failed glue, right? That could just have been 
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discarded so it failed. But someone actually saw that this could be potential for 
another use. What is our post-it-note story? …  Systematically documenting without 
taking up too much red tape, really quickly just get it up and get it searchable. That is 
the most difficult thing of all I think, how do you make it searchable.” 
 
The formal post-launch reviews were not specifically a topic in the interviews but it seems 
there might be a lack of formality in the process. Some of the divisions indicated having a 
post launch review of projects in their process descriptions, some did not. If the processes are 
structured and constantly used, or if they are just in the process description documentation 
remained an open question for the thesis writer. In the interview with division B (division that 
has a formal process according to the process description), the interviewees found that they 
were lacking formal process for post-project evaluation and learning, currently they have no 
criteria to define if the project was successful or not. 
4.3.6 Focus and effective product portfolio management 
Portfolio management was a topic where there were quite a lot of differences between the 
divisions. Generally speaking, this was seen as a problematic area in many divisions. Some of 
the divisions even indicated that they did not have any sort of formal portfolio management 
system, that they did not do any prioritization between different areas of innovation. 
Division C head of innovation said the following when asked how do they prioritize between 
projects today: 
 
“We don’t prioritize today. This is the reason why I brought up this that we have so 
many different streams as well. Some (streams) are being steered or governed through 
IT steering board, others through XXX business line steering board, others through 
business line heads etc. etc.  So we don’t really, we have a portfolio of projects, but 
the correlation between these projects are not steered in anyway today.” 
 
With the different streams he refers to innovation projects emerging from different sources 
within the division or within the rest of the company. Projects from the different kinds of 
streams are not compared in anyway, each stream having its own steering body and decision 
processes for prioritization. When further asked about how he thinks this prioritization should 
be done he said the following: 
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“I do like the idea of having the responsibility very close to the market… …But then 
we need to have governance above that to steer between those steering teams…  
especially when it comes to prioritization and where should we put the money and 
where shouldn’t we put the money. Because today we don’t compare a IT innovation 
project with X business unit innovation project but we do it within IT or we do it 
within X for instance… And I think it is also needed to have it (higher level 
prioritization). Otherwise you are prioritizing your own babies all the time.” 
 
Other divisions spoke that they were building up the portfolio in the last few years, and only 
now started to think about project prioritization. Division E director said the following when 
asked how they do project prioritization at the moment:  
“We don’t… At least not in a very structured way as of now because we have been in a 
phase of building the portfolio ramping up the organization so the last two years have 
been basically hiring a lot of people and creating the projects, creating the portfolio… 
we reach the capacity of things that we can do, and then during this year we start having 
some prioritization. But we didn’t have that yet.” 
 
On the other extreme, division B had formal scorecard in place to compare the projects in case 
of resource restrictions, and formal processes who makes the decision in different cases of 
resource conflicts. However, this scorecard structure was in place only for product development 
projects which in their case are adjacent and core innovations. The breakthroughs in this 
division were handled separately in strategic projects portfolio, which has strategically 
important innovation projects including breakthrough projects in it. In this portfolio, similar 
scorecard system was not in place, at least not yet. 
The divisions have vastly different resources in their innovation and R&D functions and this 
was visible also in the interviewees’ answers related to portfolio management. One of the 
divisions (A) interviewed said the following when asked about if they would like to add a 
scorecard (weights assigned to different financial and non-financial factors) type evaluation 
method for project prioritization: 
 
“The situation is so that we have reduced in the last 10 years from whatever 200 
people working in research, more than division B has today, to this 20-22… if we 
would still have this 180 maybe we would also do something like scorecards and 
making other evaluations of the projects, but we are so lean and mean that we can’t 
do this anymore and it does not make sense to put focus on this. We have our clear 
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priorities, we have clear decision body about the projects... We have let’s say 1/14th, 
of that, so 2.5% of maybe what division B is spending we spent for research, so we 
have to be very very different in our ways of working and that is also reflected for 
instance in this kind of selecting the projects and the project activities.” 
 
Also, the criteria to make the go / no-go decision seems to be lacking in some divisions. For 
example, division D manager said that they were lacking a formalized structure on how to move 
on from the different gates. When he was asked if the formal processes at the gates are related 
to the go / no-go decision and decision criteria standardization, he answered the following:  
 
“Yeah exactly. So, when you approach like gate one go/no-go who makes that 
decision, what is actually used to qualify if someone is able to pass or not” 
 
Director from Group Innovation and R&D rose a few interesting points, one is that key 
stakeholders might get infatuated by an idea, and another one is some projects might be kept 
alive simply because the company has already invested a lot of money into the project. 
However, it is fair to note that he had previously mentioned that he is not so concerned about 
killing the projects, indicating that the company is doing it adequately (section 4.5.5 p. 53). It 
might be that he just wanted to point out that getting infatuated by an idea or keep investing 
because you are not willing to accept sunk costs might be something that could happen. He 
answered the following to a question “Have you seen any common reason why you start some 
projects that you shouldn’t start or you continue some projects that you shouldn’t continue?”:  
 
“I think you can get infatuated by an idea. It could be a current market trend that you 
want to catch on to either because competitor is doing it or maybe wrong stakeholder 
pushes the idea. That could be a pitfall for selecting ideas that maybe the market is not 
ready for or the technology is not mature for or the production technology is not ready 
for. I think there is always the inherent risk of keeping a project alive too long because 
when you have invested a lot of money in it… I think sometimes it could be if you 
allow a project (to continue) because you think you are really really close to solving 
it, that to keep investing is something (you do), consuming more money than intended 
because you think you already spent enough money, otherwise all of this money will 
be wasted. That is of course always the risk. On the other hand then that typically is 
always balanced by a very optimistic outlook on what the market could be if we 
succeed. It doesn’t happen if it is smaller market or market potential.” 
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So, the only thing that can be said about the innovation portfolio management at the case 
company overall is that the processes, governance models and resources behind the processes 
vary substantially. Therefore, the problems the different divisions have also vary substantially.   
 
4.3.7 Next generation Stage-Gates 
Stage-gate models were both seen and not seen as something that should be modified to 
different types of innovation. In this case, the question asked was “should there be a separate 
stage-gate “track” for breakthrough innovations than for adjacent and core?” Four out of the six 
functions (5 divisions and Innovation and R&D) said there should be a separate model to assess 
breakthrough type innovations. See table 7 below for function specific reasoning behind 
supporting or not supporting the separate stage-gate track for breakthrough.  
 
Division Breakthrough 
innovations need 
a separate 
process 
Clarifying comments 
A No Wants a process that fits all types of innovation projects. 
However, said that one thing should be reflected earlier for 
breakthroughs, how to make the market entrance and sell 
the product 
B Yes Currently have separate process for strategic projects 
(includes breakthrough innovations). The process is not as 
well established as the process used for other product 
development projects. Would want to do that from scratch 
and focus more on iterative part of the projects. 
C Yes Different processes for different types of innovation. In 
adjacent innovations, some parts could be skipped, 
meanwhile for breakthrough and core, more time should be 
spent in the first parts of the process rather than the last 
ones. 
D No Did not see a need for a different process, while saying he 
might be overlooking something 
E Yes Would use the same process for all innovations, but would 
skip some parts for adjacent and core innovations. For 
example, for adjacent and core innovations, it could be 
possible to start the project already at stage 3, meanwhile 
breakthrough innovations would go through the whole 
process. 
Group 
Innovation 
and R&D 
Yes Early stages of the breakthrough process should be 
prolonged and much more iterative. The current stage-gate 
models work well for adjacent and core innovations. 
Table 7: Separate process or same process to assess breakthrough innovations 
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What the track for breakthrough would comprise of has been discussed in the earlier parts of 
the thesis. The biggest issues identified are: higher focus on the early parts of the process (4.3.2), 
the iterative nature of the early parts (4.3.3), customer focus from the beginning of the project 
(4.3.1), and not relying on financial numbers early on in the process (4.3.5). 
For adjacent innovation projects, some of the interviewees recommended express stage-gate 
model, in other words skipping some stages, or relying on checklists and going through the 
stages fast (4.3.2). Some of the divisions also ran less detailed processes for low budget projects. 
For example, specialist from division B said that one of the weaknesses of their stage-gate 
model was that it is quite big package, and some saw it as too slow. In small projects, they did 
not run the full stage-gate model. He said the following when asked if they run the whole stage-
gate process for also the small projects: 
 
“For product development projects, we have a limit of 20k€ of product 
development costs or if the specification changes then it should be a project and 
it should follow the same process. So, the smaller than that are called assignments 
and then it is a lot lighter model” 
 
One aspect that some of the divisions emphasized was that their division had such a unique 
nature in their business and therefore their stage-gate model had to be different compared to 
other divisions. However, it seemed that the problem was not that the stage-gate models should 
vary between the divisions, but between the different types of innovation projects (breakthrough 
and adjacent). The biggest differences in the stage-gate models were in divisions E and D when 
compared to the other divisions that had quite similar stage-gate models. Division E has mostly 
breakthrough innovations, around 90% of their portfolio. Division D does not really have 
breakthrough innovations in their portfolio. However, many of their product development 
projects are modifying the existing products for new customers. The interviewee did not classify 
these types of projects as breakthrough, as the technology risk in these types of projects is not 
that high and the developed product is somewhat similar to the existing ones. Still, because the 
projects are for new customers, they had added this previously mentioned commercialization 
framework to tackle this problem. The other three interviewed division were mainly doing 
adjacent innovations and their stage-gate models reflected this. 
So, the divisions have modified their processes to suit their type of innovation projects. If there 
were separate tracks for breakthrough and for other types of innovation, it could be that the 
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divisions would not have as strong a need to differentiate their stage-gate process. When asked 
about why do the divisions’ stage-gate processes differ, the director from Group Innovation and 
R&D had this answer: 
“The inherent perception that their business is unique. I don’t, honestly, I don’t see that 
there is an articulated need to have difference because the content looking at it for 
adjacent innovation should not have to trigger any differences in the gate process. What 
I have seen and speaking into division E is this imperfection what you have with 
breakthrough and you try to push that through adjacent innovation funnel and that of 
course doesn’t really work so it is better to have a side track that caters for that need, 
and then keep the adjacent innovation stage-gate locked and ready in this current 
format.” 
 
Support for having similar processes across divisions came from divisions side too (see table 8 
at the end of this section). One common argument for having same or similar processes was 
that the principles behind the innovation matter more than the actual innovation you are 
developing, it does not matter if you are developing a chair or a table if you are still developing 
breakthrough innovation. The head of innovation of division C said the following when asked 
about the biggest benefits of having same or similar processes: 
“I think that if you have a process and you follow a process then you can develop a 
process. If you don’t have a process or if you have 10 different processes, and then 10 
different governance, and 10 different everything, then it’s harder to develop them all 
in the same direction... If you are talking about for instance breakthrough innovations, 
it doesn’t matter if the end-product is going to be a chair or a table. You still need to go 
out there looking to who are the customers, what are the pain points that the customers 
have today, what do they want to sell etc. etc. it doesn’t matter what you actually 
produce. So, having a process, then you can develop it. Having 10 processes then you 
will never ever be able to develop it to perfection.” 
 
One complicating factor regarding adopting cross-divisionally used innovation processes is that 
the level of documentation required differed significantly, even between the adjacent 
innovation models. For example, director from division A mentioned a couple of times during 
the interview that they needed to be lean and mean to work with the resources they have. The 
quote in section 4.2.6 highlighted that they would not want to adapt similar scorecard method 
as division B has, and later during the interview he mentioned again how the resources restrict 
them to adopt more detailed processes: 
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“We will be very very careful with extending our work or running gate-decisions or 
preparing gate-templates as for instance division E is doing like this. If we would need 
to do this like E, we can’t do this. Then we run not anymore 39 projects in the year, total 
year maybe 50-60 projects, then we just run 10 projects. If at all because we don’t have 
the resources to make all this nice and shiny reporting templates and we don’t have the 
people for doing this.” 
 
This raises some important questions, on whether it is justified to run that many projects with 
leaner documentation, and does it result in suboptimal project selection? This thesis will not 
discuss this issue in detail but for the case company it would be wise to try to answer the 
question: Have the divisions with more detailed adjacent innovation processes and more 
documentation been more successful in their project selection? This of course works both ways, 
if the divisions have not been more accurate in the project selection, what justifies the heavier 
process? Another question this raises is, would the divisions with smaller resources be able to 
cope with as comprehensive processes as the larger divisions even if more comprehensive 
processes would result in better project selection?  
From the interviewed functions three clearly indicated that the processes used at different 
divisions should be similar for all types of projects, one indicated that the processes should be 
similar for strategic projects, one indicated that similar processes would be beneficial but not 
possible, and from one function it was not possible to interpret the answer as a clear yes or no. 
The function specific answers and clarifications for those answers are listed in table 8 below. 
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Division Should the 
processes be 
unified? 
Clarifying comments 
A Would be 
beneficial but 
nearly 
impossible 
without 
deviations 
Every division might have different aspects that need to be 
reflected in the stage-gate model. For example, resources of the 
divisions are different and therefore the detail of the 
documentation can be different. 
B Not for normal 
product 
development, 
yes for 
strategic 
projects 
Hard to make structured and detailed processes for product 
development projects as the organizations are not similar. 
However, for the strategic projects (includes breakthrough and 
other long, strategically important projects) and the ideation, 
for those it would make more sense to have the at least very 
similar processes. 
C Yes There should be different processes for breakthrough/adjacent, 
but within e.g. breakthrough no need to have different 
processes between divisions. Group innovation and R&D could 
have a role in unifying the processes and helping to foster 
process improvements. 
D Cannot tell 
based on 
answer 
In theory, yes, but in practice it might be challenging. The 
business logics of different divisions are quite different, how 
much is focused on commercialization and how much is focused 
on R&D. The divisions with similar type customers could have 
similar stage-gate models. 
E Yes, but with a 
little bit 
flexibility 
It is more about the principles behind, if there are different 
processes for different types of innovations, it should be alright 
to unify the processes. The processes should be similar but not 
the same, the divisions should have some flexibility to adapt for 
the different realities. 
Group 
Innovation 
and R&D 
Yes As long as there are different processes for breakthrough and 
adjacent, there is no need to have different processes between 
the divisions. 
 
  
Table 8: Unified or differentiated processes between divisions 
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5 DISCUSSION 
Based on the data from the interviews, some of the seven principles identified by Cooper and 
Edgett (2008) seem to be related more to breakthrough innovations than to adjacent innovations. 
Listening to the voice of the customer, heavy front-end loaded process, and iterative nature of 
the development came to discussion often when speaking specifically about breakthrough 
innovations. Moreover, the first three principles came into discussion as one larger theme rather 
than three individual topics. The interviewees emphasized the importance of early parts of the 
process and the iterative nature when assessing breakthrough innovations, and when asked what 
these iterative early parts would include, the answer most often was a strong customer emphasis 
and iterating with the customers. This finding of importance of iterative front-end is in line with 
previous research, Veryzer (1998), Herstatt et al. (2008) and Bertels et al. (2013) all highlight 
the importance of iterative front-end loaded development for breakthrough type innovations.  
To get the customer and market perspectives in for breakthrough projects in the early parts was 
a key issue identified in the interviews. Herstatt et al. (2008) found that the market size and 
customer price sensitivity were harder to identify for radical innovations than incremental 
innovations. Bertels et al. (2013) state that understanding the market is vital for both 
incremental and radical innovations, but in radical innovation projects quantifying the sales and 
market numbers were not beneficial. It might be that the desire to truly understand the market 
and the customer were a reaction to hope to decrease the uncertainty in the breakthrough 
innovation project assessment at the case company. In the interviews the respondents 
emphasized things like understanding customer value proposition and customer needs, is the 
market attractive, and what the competitive landscape is like. These things are not necessarily 
quantifiable factors, they are questions where you will get qualitative answers to. It seems that 
at the case company, at least the interviewed people do not want to cope with the uncertainty 
by asking for specific numbers but by asking questions and learning from these questions. 
However, this might not be the case in the case company overall, as the previously mentioned 
“the facts and figures rule at the company” comment indicate. 
Another interesting point related to the fuzzy front-end was that some of the interviewees 
proposed for adjacent innovations “express stage-gates”, or skipping some steps in the fuzzy 
front-end, or relying on check-lists and going through some of the first steps fast. The academic 
literature does not seem to back this suggestion. For example, Herstatt et al. (2008) found that 
fuzzy front-end work is beneficial for both incremental and radical innovation projects. It seems 
to be more that the activities within the fuzzy front-end should be different (Bertels et al. 2013, 
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Veryzer 1998). In adjacent innovation projects estimating business cases are more beneficial 
than in breakthrough innovation projects (Bertels et al. 2013), and it is easier to estimate market 
sizes (Herstatt et al. 2008). On the other hand, breakthrough type projects rely more on iteration 
and learning in these early stages (Veryzer 1998, Bertels et al. 2013). Also, Souder et al. (1998) 
explain that as uncertainty increases, typically more design change frequency is needed. 
However, opposing view comes from Cooper and Edgett (2012) who mention that for low-risk, 
low-budget product enhancements, shorter and streamlined stage-gate model could be used. 
The key word here might be low-budget, there might not be reason to run extensive and time 
consuming stage-gate process for small projects that will have a small effect. In the interviews, 
some of the divisions told about running leaner processes for projects below certain budget. 
Four out of six functions (see table 6 in section 4.3.5) indicated that the use of financial 
indicators required flexibility, or they are inadequate at evaluating breakthrough products in 
early stages. Only one interviewee clearly indicated that their importance for this type of 
projects should be high from start to finish, and from one interview, clear view regarding this 
question could not be interpreted. The interviewees who said that the role of financial should 
be smaller in the beginning all indicated that the role of these figures, and the detail of the 
calculations, would increase after the early stages, as more information is acquired. Findings 
are in line with Nagji and Tuff (2012) view that financial indicators assess this type of 
innovations poorly.   
When it came to what type of indicators these four functions wanted to emphasize in the early 
stages, customer and market aspects were mentioned by all of them. Herstatt et al. (2008) 
indicates that it is harder to estimate market size for breakthrough type innovations, and Bertels 
et al. (2013) study indicates that in the early stages, understanding the market has a significant 
impact on success of breakthrough innovations, but the quantification of the business case does 
not hold significant importance. In line with these studies, the interviewees did not seem to push 
for market size type indicators. They rather spoke about indicators or aspects related to learning 
about the project. For example, one of the interviewees mentioned indicators related to “how 
many contacts have you had with a customer” or “quantitative things to gather information”. 
Another one emphasized things like “understanding if we can differentiate ourselves in the 
market“, “understand what is the business case for the customer”, or “understand what type 
of business models we can operate with”. These aspects cannot be even called indicators, but 
they are worth mentioning in this context, as they came to discussion as alternatives for financial 
indicators in the early stages of breakthrough projects. Also, other topics than customer and 
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market indicators arose. E.g. strategy fit, technical capability match with the company, and the 
learning potential of the initiative. 
 
When it comes to the topic of portfolio management it is impossible to make any generalizations 
from the case company as the processes vary substantially based on the interviews and the 
documents provided by the divisions. Cooper et al. (1999) study indicates that the best 
performing companies have more formal processes and the processes are used systematically 
for all project evaluations. This kind of systematic process is not happening at the case company 
company-wide, and in some divisions not even within the divisions themselves. A newer study 
from Cooper and Edgett (2008) say that a good practice for portfolio management is setting 
aside “strategic buckets of resources” for different types of projects, which includes projects 
that are in different market segments. In the case company context setting aside resources for 
different types of projects can mean resources for different divisions or for different types of 
projects within divisions. However, setting aside resources does not mean that the portfolio 
management processes should not still be formalized and used systematically.  
 
Cooper et al. (1999) study indicates that relying on financial methods, like NPV or IRR, in 
project prioritization results in poorly performing portfolios, meanwhile relying more on 
strategic approaches and scorecards resulted in better performing portfolios. Relying on more 
methods resulted in better performing portfolios than relying just on few methods. In the case 
company, it can be said that all three of these method groups were present at varying levels. 
Some divisions had scorecards and some did not, some process templates had more emphasis 
on strategic fit than others, and financial factors seemed to have different weight in different 
divisions based on the interviews, with some emphasizing non-financial aspects much more 
than others.  
 
Some of the divisions indicated that they did not have clear Go / kill criteria in place at the 
gates. Cooper and Edgett (2012) study indicates that having clear criteria to make the go / kill 
decision at the gate is a clear best practice, with 85% of best performers employing this 
compared to only 25.9% did. Actually making the go / kill decisions at the meetings was another 
clear best practice, with 60% of best performers having this practice compared to 25.9% of the 
worst performers. At the case company, some interviewees indicated that their divisions do not 
do these decisions, at least not systematically. This was for example due to “ramping up the 
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portfolio” in one division, and in another division, they had so many different “streams” of 
innovations that it was hard to systematically prioritize the projects. 
Four out of six interviewed functions indicated that breakthrough innovations need a separate 
process (see table 7 in section 4.3.7). In Cooper and Edgett (2012) study 75% of best performers 
(top 25%) indicated having flexible stage-gate models that are modified for different types of 
projects (e.g. risk level, scale of the project), meanwhile from the worst performers (bottom 
25%) 37% indicated so. Having flexibility in the stage-gate process seems to be a best practice, 
which also has relatively high amount of support in the case organization.  
The topic of process unification across divisions is a challenging topic both in terms of 
information from the case company (see table 8 in section 4.3.7), and based on the lack of 
academic studies. Process unification refers to having same or similar processes across 
divisions to run innovation projects, different types of innovation could still have different types 
of processes. Four out of six functions clearly indicated that cross-divisional process unification 
would be a good idea, from which one indicated that it would make sense only for strategic 
(includes breakthrough) projects. From the remaining two, one said unification would be 
beneficial but not possible, and from the other interview a clear opinion about process 
unification could not be interpreted. Two out of four functions that supported process 
unification said that the processes should be the same, and two said the processes should be 
similar but maybe not the same.  
Main argument supporting process unification was that it is more about the principles behind 
the innovation rather than what the innovation is, and that it would be beneficial to have similar 
innovation processes. Arguments against having similar processes were that the divisions have 
such a unique nature in their businesses that common processes cannot capture the reality of 
their businesses. One division also emphasized that the different resources of different divisions 
make running similar processes impossible, the smaller resources divisions simply cannot run 
the process that larger resources divisions do. See table 9 below for benefits and challenges of 
having similar innovation processes identified in the interviews. 
In academia, it is argued that different types of innovations require different processes (e.g. 
Cooper and Edgett 2008 & 2012, Bertels et al. 2013). However, whether the same types of 
innovations require different processes in different contexts is a question that has got less 
attention. It is still an open question if it is beneficial for companies to have the same, or at least 
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similar, processes for similar types of innovations in different divisions of the company, or are 
the realities of different divisions so different that similar processes are not beneficial. 
 
 
Lastly, an interesting point related to breakthrough innovations and Cooper and Edgett’s (2008) 
seven principles of successful NPD is the fact that many of the principles came into discussion 
in the interviews specifically when speaking about breakthrough innovations. This would 
suggest that the principles are more related to breakthrough innovations, and this would further 
indicate that best performing innovators have processes built more fore breakthrough 
innovations than for adjacent innovations.  The best performers are top 25% of companies based 
on NPD productivity, which is calculated by dividing last 5 years’ sales or profit from new 
products with R&D spending as a percentage of total sales of the company. Nagji and Tuff 
(2012) say that around 70% of returns in high-performing companies come from 
transformational innovations. These factors could indicate that the best performing innovators 
are separated from the rest mainly by the way they handle breakthrough innovations, as their 
share of the returns is so large. 
Table 9: Benefits and challenges of having similar innovation processes  
Benefits of having similar innovation 
processes 
Challenges of having similar innovation 
processes 
This would enable the development of one 
process further rather than having to develop 
many parallel processes. 
Divisions or individual people may want to reflect 
some aspects in the process more than others, 
this may cause the process to be too generic or 
diluted. 
This would enable to find the best practices and 
share them transparently within the company, 
and to speak the same language. 
Resources of different divisions may cause the 
process to be too heavy for smaller innovation 
functions, or other way around it could end up 
being too light for the innovation functions who 
currently have strict processes. 
Eventually, this could enable people (e.g. 
project managers, market intelligence) to 
transfer between divisions based on need, 
enabling sharing of best practices through 
physical interaction of the people. 
 
This would enable to see how the innovation 
projects are progressing on a company level. 
For example, how many projects are at stage 1. 
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6 CONSTRUCTION 
In the process of analysing the data, several areas of improvement were identified. The 
construction section is structured so that in the first part two larger “Tier 1” issues are discussed 
in more detail and in the second part other “Tier 2” issues that were identified are brought up 
but with limited discussion. The division to Tier 1 and Tier 2 does not imply the importance of 
the topics, nor does it mean that they would be harder to implement. They are Tier 1 simply 
because more material related to these changes were found during the interviews with the 
divisions. 
6.1 Tier 1: Breakthrough side-track & why to unify the processes  
Breakthrough innovation side-track: 
It became quite evident that there is a huge difference when assessing breakthrough innovations 
compared to adjacent and core innovations. Most critical differences are related to the role of 
risk, role of hard figures (e.g. financial and market figures), and to the role of iteration and 
learning. These differences are discussed in more detail in later parts of this chapter. At first, 
the author pondered if it would be possible to still have just one way to conduct the process 
(same process for core/adjacent and breakthrough) but soon abandoned the idea because of 
these huge differences. Therefore, this thesis proposes having a separate track in the stage-gate 
model modified for breakthrough innovations. Having flexibility in the innovation processes to 
cater to different types of innovation is widely used among the best performing companies, 
from whom 75% indicated that they do not have one-size-fits-all stage-gate model (Cooper and 
Edgett 2012).  
The separate track model continues to have a model that would be similar with the model 
currently used in divisions that have mostly adjacent innovation projects, this model however 
should be unified as discussed more in section “why to unify the processes”. The proposed 
separate track would be used for breakthrough innovations and it could be used also for other 
major strategic projects, that are not breakthrough but involve a high risk and uncertainty. See 
the proposed side-track model in the figure 5 below.  
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First three stages in the breakthrough model are iterative by nature, and especially the first two 
stages are heavily interlinked. In “Concept Shaping” stage the aim is to prototype different 
technical solutions to see which work for the idea, and to avoid potential technical pitfalls. In 
the “Concept Validation” stage, these different technical solutions are iterated with the 
customers, test-feedback-revise loops for the different technical solutions are gone through to 
build the perfect value proposition. It is quite evident that information acquired in concept 
validation stage might result in a need to go back to concept shaping stage (or need to kill the 
project). For example, if the company found several technical solutions for the idea in the 
concept shaping stage, and in concept validation stage it tested those ideas with the customers 
and got feedback that the product does not match any of the potential customers’ needs due to 
product characteristics X, Y, Z, the company should be able to go back to the concept shaping 
stage if it believes those X, Y, Z could be changed. Concept shaping and concept validation 
stages aim to build the knowledge base to pick up the best ideas for the more expensive later 
stages and to allow smooth progress of the product development process later for the products 
that get through.  
 
As mentioned above, the activities done in the first two stages may overlap. There also might 
be a need to do concept validation stage activities already in the concept shaping stage. Because 
of this natural linkage, three different options on how to handle these first two stages were 
Figure 5: Proposed framework for breakthrough innovations 
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identified. This thesis recommends adopting either one of the first two options, or to try them 
both and test which one works better. 
 
The first option is to treat the stages separately, requiring the gate 1 go-decision, technical proof 
that the product might be possible to produce, to “unlock” more resources for the project. The 
project team could do the activities of both these two stages even prior the gate 1 decision. Also, 
after the gate 1 decision, the team could still do concept shaping activities if there is a need for 
it. This would enable the flexibility for the project team to choose to which of the activities in 
these highly interlinked first two stages it focuses on, keeping the project work more flexible. 
Still, it would incentivise the project team to find tangible technical results to unlock further 
resources for the project, giving a clear goal for the early stages of the project work. 
 
The second option would be very similar with the first one. The stages would be separate and 
there would be the gate 1 decision to unlock more resources for the project. The project team 
would still be able to choose which of the activities from the first two stages it focuses on. The 
difference would be in the gate 1 decision. In this decision, the project team could present either 
found technical solutions with a proposed potential value proposition, or more detailed 
customer validated value proposition with a technical plan on how to reach it. The strength of 
this option would be that it enables the process to cater to ideas that originate from different 
sources, either from the customer validated pains or from more technical origins. This way the 
process would take into consideration both the divisions that are more R&D heavy and the 
divisions that are more customer oriented. However, it would leave an open question, how to 
fairly assess projects that are at the same gate but whose gate material is focused on different 
topics? A weakness of this option would be that it does not give as clear goal for the project 
team to focus on as the first option would. 
 
The third and the last option would be to treat the stages as simply one larger stage that would 
prepare the project for the gate 2 decision. You would get a go-decision at the gate 0 for this 
larger single stage, and it would be up to the product development team to choose which of the 
activities they focus on. This option would enable the highest amount of flexibility for the 
project team. However, this would cause the gate 0 decision to be very large in monetary value 
compared to what is known about the project at that time. It could also lead to small “chaos” if 
the project team tries to do too many activities at the same time, and it would not give a clear 
goal on what to focus on.    
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All the proposed options lead to similar gate 2 decision process. The gate 2 decision would be 
based on similar factors as it currently is at the case company’s processes. Among other things, 
main points are if the product seems to be technically possible to produce at a reasonable price, 
and that there is customer validated value proposition for the product. After this comes the 
feasibility stage that would also be similar in all proposed options. In the “Feasibility” stage 
first small scale pilot plant is made to test the technical feasibility to produce the product in 
small numbers, and to test the market with initial sales. At this feasibility stage, first information 
from the sales can be used to still alter the product characteristics if the market response 
indicates a need for it. Therefore, this stage includes “looped arrows” in the figure 5, even as 
its nature is not as iterative as in the first two stages. At the end of feasibility stage, detailed 
business plan with a focus on financial figures can be finally made for the breakthrough 
innovation.  
 
After the feasibility stage, the process follows typical linear stage-gate model. Implementation 
is a ramp up stage to larger scale pilot plant, testing the market further, and commercialization 
is a ramp up to industrial sized plant and integrating the product to existing business functions. 
It is important to note that even as the implementation and commercialization are relatively 
straight forward steps in the process description, most of the costs are accumulated in those 
steps. On the other hand, most of the information that results in the success of these steps are 
gathered in the fuzzy front end (concept shaping, concept validation, and to some extent 
feasibility). 
 
So, the proposed breakthrough stage-gate model differs from the typical adjacent stage-gate 
model in the early parts. It is more iterative and the detailed financial calculations are done the 
first time for gate 3. This leaves open questions, such as, what to focus on in the early parts, 
and what is the main input for the gate decisions if not financial numbers? 
 
The proposition for the focus is learning. Why learning? As one person from the interviews 
said, the hit rate of breakthrough innovations is maybe 1/8 or 1/10, but there is learning potential 
in all projects, even in the failed ones that the other projects may benefit from. Herstatt et al. 
(2008) study indicates that in radical innovation projects, the organizations learn more than in 
incremental innovation projects. Why not try to embrace these characteristics and build a 
process that tries to capture every last drop of the potential learnings and share them 
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transparently within the innovation community in the company? Bertels et al. (2013) study 
indicated that more iterative learning approach results in better performance for breakthrough 
innovations. Evans et al. (2013) speak about similar a thing, proposing that the number one 
reason for new products to fail is not spending enough time in the beginning of the process 
building the knowledge base and therefore picking suboptimal projects to be continued.   
 
Therefore, learning should be the key criteria when developing breakthroughs in the early parts 
of the process. What could be learned if we continue this project and how do these activities 
benefit the project going forward, should be key questions to be asked. This should be reflected 
in the stage-gate process as well, asking questions that may benefit the project and the people 
working with the projects. Examples of these could be: 
• What is our unique value proposition to the customer and why this is a good value 
proposition? 
• How is the changing environmental legislation going to affect this product in X years? 
• Why our company is the best place to develop the product? 
• Could the developed technology have other areas of usage? 
 
 
 
These kinds of questions should have higher priority than asking detailed numbers early on that 
are deemed wrong anyway. There is a time and a place for detailed financial analysis but it 
should be done later, just before gate 3 decision as more information about the market and 
technical aspects has been acquired. 
 
One aspect that was emphasized for breakthrough innovations in the interviews was to bring 
the customer perspective in earlier in the process. Partnering with customers in innovation 
context is both common (Enkel and Gassmann 2008) and it has been proven to have a 
significant effect on innovation performance (Brettel and Cleven 2011).  
 
However, how bringing in the customer perspective early in the process relates to breakthrough 
innovations’ success is a trickier question. Veryzer (1998) proposes that for discontinuous 
innovations, partnering with customers is not beneficial as the customers do not understand the 
discontinuous innovations due to their very nature, they break the logical chain of incremental 
innovations that the customers are accustomed to. The customers do not know what they need. 
Herstatt et al (2008) on the other hand found that taking the customer perspective into 
consideration in the fuzzy front-end had the highest effect on reducing uncertainty, and that the 
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companies that were in frequent contact with the customers understood relatively well the needs 
of the customer. However, translating those customer needs to technical language was a large 
issue in radical innovation projects. This indicates that a common pitfall may not be the 
communication with the customers but rather within the company itself. Herstatt et al. (2008) 
also found that it was significantly harder to estimate the market size and the customer price 
sensitivity for radical innovations compared to incremental innovations. Bertels et al. (2013) 
concluded that understanding the market was a critical factor for success for both breakthrough 
and incremental innovations, but quantifying the market and sales early were important drivers 
of success only for incremental innovation projects, the quantification did not have significant 
impact on breakthrough innovation projects.  
 
Based on the academia cited above and the interviews, it seems that learning should take its 
place also in the market assessment rather than trying to figure out quantifiable factors, like 
detailed market size and sales forecasts. “How large is market X?” is less important question 
than “how can we penetrate market X?”. Similar to financial forecasts, detailed market 
calculations should take place later in the funnel. Of course, this does not mean any type of 
market size estimation should not be made in the very beginning. There needs to be 
understanding that the market is big enough but does it really matter at this early stage if the 
market seems to be 200M€ or 250M€ if both scenarios would be extremely lucrative business 
opportunities and it is more about if this product can be made?  
 
How to make the go and no-go decisions for the breakthrough innovations is a question there 
is no easy answer to. It is easier to answer what should not be major input in the decisions 
making process than what should be. Cooper et al. (1999) concluded that relying on financial 
indicators like NPV and IRR result in poorly performing new product portfolios, Nagji and Tuff 
(2012) suggest that traditional financial metrics assess transformational innovation efforts 
poorly, especially in the early stages, Berteles et al. (2013) explain that quantifying markets do 
not have effect on breakthrough innovation performance, and Herstatt et al. (2008) say that 
quantifying market size is significantly harder for radical innovations than for incremental 
innovations. Also, the interviewees emphasized how hard it is to get meaningful numbers for 
breakthrough innovations. Some of the interviewees even spoke about partly relying on gut 
feeling when assessing breakthroughs. Hard figures seem to clearly not be the answer how to 
make the go / no-go decisions for breakthroughs. 
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Denning (2005) speaks that stories complemented with traditional analytical approaches are in 
the centre of persuasion when transformational innovations gain ground in the company. That 
may be true in practice, but it can be argued that the process and the gate decisions cannot be 
built as competitions who tells the best stories.  
 
Cooper et al. (1999) concluded that using multiple decision making methods resulted in better 
performing new product portfolios than using fewer methods. As far as methods are concerned, 
their study indicated that strategic approaches (business’s strategy is the basis for money 
allocation) and scoring models (scorecards, where the projects are scored based on multiple 
criteria) resulted in the best performing portfolios. A bit similar to this, Sanchez and Robert 
(2010) propose that companies should develop KPIs for the project portfolio to take into 
consideration the strategic perspective and the objectives of the portfolio. Another key finding 
from Cooper et al. (1999) study was that the best performing companies had more formal 
processes and the processes were used systematically for all project evaluations.  
 
Another point to consider is should the scorecard criteria differ for breakthrough innovations 
compared to adjacent and score? This is a question where there is limited amount of studies 
available. There are studies that speak about the different aspects to consider when assessing 
breakthrough type innovations. Nagji and Tuff (2012) speak about how financial figures are not 
appropriate to evaluate transformational innovation efforts early on in the process, Bertels et al. 
(2013) found that quantifying the market does not have a significant effect on breakthrough 
project success, and Hertstatt et al. (2008) found that it is significantly harder to estimate market 
size for radical innovations than for less risky innovations. This would indicate that the 
scorecard should be different to take into consideration the different aspects of the 
breakthroughs. However, how companies actually design these scorecards for breakthrough 
innovations is an area where there is limited research. This may be due to the sensitive nature 
of the topic for organizations. 
 
The proposition of this thesis for the main input in gate decisions (early on) for breakthrough 
innovations is combination of strategic approach and scorecard, meanwhile the financial aspect 
in the beginning would be just to get an idea that the project is big enough to have financial 
potential. Learning potential of the project would be key ingredient in the gate 0 decision, 
similarly to Nagji and Tuff (2012) example about Google, who have learning potential as the 
only initial hurdle at the beginning of the project for transformational innovation efforts. After 
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that its importance would shrink. From gate 3 onwards the gate criteria could be relatively 
similar to adjacent and core innovations. Proposed key gate questions and key gate inputs are 
listed in the figure 6 below. 
 
 
There is currently a process of developing scorecards happening at the organization on at least 
three different fronts, at two of the divisions and at group level. According to Cooper et al. 
(1999) the best performing businesses employed much more formal and explicit methods to 
assess their portfolio, and consistently for all the projects. Therefore, these development 
processes should be unified under one development process. However, as discussed above, 
breakthrough innovations cannot be judged by the same criteria as adjacent and core projects 
are judged, especially early on. Cooper and Edgett (2008) mention that some high performing 
businesses set up strategic buckets of resources for different types of innovation projects, e.g. 
depending on market segment or technology. One option for the case company would be to set 
up a fund for only breakthrough innovations and develop separate scorecard for the 
breakthrough projects. Moreover, this fund could be used to fund just the fuzzy-front-end part 
of the breakthrough development, as after the fuzzy-front-end, the difference to adjacent and 
core innovations is not as high. 
 
What about the strategic approach? Strategy aspects should of course be an aspect of scorecards, 
whether they are developed for breakthrough projects or adjacent and core projects. However, 
Figure 6: Proposed key gate questions and key gate inputs 
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in innovation projects, especially breakthrough projects, there is a part that cannot be presented 
easily, especially in a single number as it would be in scorecards. The part that is based on “gut 
feeling” as some of the interviewees put it, or to storytelling as Denning (2005) put it. This part 
cannot be captured by scorecards, but it might be possible to be captured through rigorous, more 
descriptive, business cases and when pitching the idea to the innovation board, or whatever the 
name of the decision-making body at gate decisions is. Therefore, complementing scorecard 
with more descriptive business cases in the decision making is justified. 
      
Why unify the innovation processes between divisions? 
 
Many of the divisions justify having different frameworks by the nature of their business. 
However, this problem might not be so evident if there were unified processes for different 
types of innovation. There was the attempt to unify the processes at the company some years 
back but the end-product was one-size-fits-all solution. After that, some divisions have 
modified their processes, for example to suit more breakthrough innovation due to the fact that 
breakthrough plays a huge role in their innovation portfolio. If different tracks for breakthrough 
and adjacent innovation will be applied, the change process should be easier to accept for 
divisions that mainly have innovation processes for certain type of innovation. Divisions with 
mostly adjacent innovation will continue to use mostly the adjacent process and divisions with 
mostly breakthrough innovations do not have to use the adjacent model that much. Still, the 
structures would be in place for both types of divisions if and when they encounter type of 
innovation project not so common for them. Minor modifications (additions) could be allowed 
if deemed necessary. The common framework should act as a minimum standard for all 
innovation processes within the company. Table 9 in section 5 summarizes the benefits and 
challenges of having similar innovation processes that were identified in the interviews. 
 
This thesis will not go into precise detail of what the process for adjacent innovations should 
be like. However, there are some reasons why the breakthrough model should not be used for 
the adjacent and core innovations as well. First, there is less uncertainty in the market as well 
as in the technical development. Therefore, the financial figures and market figures can be 
estimated relatively accurately earlier. Their role in the decision-making process can be higher 
also in the beginning. The second point is the fact that overall the adjacent models used at the 
company are working well for adjacent innovations. Therefore, small changes the small changes 
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need for unification are justified but there is no need to break apart and rebuilt the whole 
process. 
6.2 Tier 2: Other issues identified during the work 
Tier 2 section discusses other issues that arose during the thesis work which will be discussed 
in lesser detail. This does not indicate that the issues would be less important than the tier 1 
issues, they have simply been studied in less detail during the thesis work. 
 
Software tool for communication & communication overall: 
The communication between the divisions seems to be poor. The innovation community needs 
a software tool that would be used to document project findings and share them transparently 
for all the innovation community within the company. The usability of the tool, and the 
searchability of the project findings would be important factors to get the benefits out of this 
tool. Therefore, the innovation community should play a big part in the development of the tool. 
This tool could also be used to make Stage-Gate processes, meaning which gate you are on and 
what activities have you conducted etc., visible in real time. The proposed project findings 
documentation software tool is also a part in the proposed breakthrough innovation framework 
(see figure 5), as without proper documentation the learning emphasis in the framework cannot 
properly work in practice.  
 
The overall communication between the divisions innovation units should increase. Innovation 
day, where people from the innovation community were invited to spent a day together and 
share ideas, was mentioned as a great initiative by one of the interviewees. Other forms of 
collaboration could also be encouraged. One possibility would be to invite different divisions’ 
R&D people to work with other divisions innovation projects. Troy et al. (2008) study indicates 
that integrating teams (different background people working on a single project) had much 
higher effect on new product success than collaborating higher up on organizational level. This 
should be taken into consideration when discussing collaboration possibilities within the 
company. 
 
Governance of innovations and clear go / no-go criteria: 
 
The governance structures of innovation management are not standardized, different divisions 
rely on different structures to do the project prioritization. One interviewee was speaking about 
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how his division was relying on different “streams” where innovations come from, and that the 
prioritization was not done on higher level, meaning between the different streams. Another 
one said that they did not have clear criteria to decide what projects are eligible to pass from 
gates. Third one said that there might be a risk of getting infatuated by an idea, or keep spending 
just because you have already spent a lot on the project. Relying on different streams, and not 
having clear go/no-go criteria at the gates, might lead to the problems the third one said, getting 
infatuated by an idea and spending just because you are not willing to accept sunk costs. This 
can also lead to “protecting your own babies” as one interviewee put it. 
 
According to Cooper and Edgett (2012), simply having go / no-go criteria defined is a strong  
differentiating factor between the best performers (85%) and the worst performers (25.9%). The 
clearly defined criteria might have a link with “objectivity and fact base for the decisions”, from 
the best performers 57.9% said they do decisions objectively and based on facts, meanwhile 
from the worst performers only 14.8% indicated so. Therefore, the case company should set up 
more clear decision criteria and clear governance models, to avoid getting infatuated by ideas 
or to avoid “protecting own babies”. Also, truly making the go / no-go decisions at the meetings 
is a clear best practice, 60% of the best performers systematically do this, meanwhile 25.9% of 
the worst performers do this. The decisions meetings should not be only information sessions 
about project progress, but decision forums. The comment regarding keeping projects alive and 
not accepting sunk costs might indicate a need for more systematic go / no-go decisions at the 
meetings. 
 
However, when it comes to what governance structures the case company should employ, there 
seems to be no “silver bullet”. There is no evidence of which governance structures work best 
in practice (Cooper and Edgett 2012). Therefore, this thesis cannot suggest any concrete 
solutions for this. Identifying what of the varying governance models work best in practice at 
the case company, and applying those best practices systematically at the case company could 
be a good starting point. 
 
Home for the breakthroughs: 
At some of the interviews different kinds of organizational structures were discussed related to 
the breakthrough innovations. One interviewee mentioned supporting small homes inside a big 
corporation where the breakthroughs are given time and room to flourish. Similar to this, Evans 
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et al. (2013) proposed using incubators to foster the higher-risk, long-term projects in safe 
space. Another interviewee spoke about a similar thing related to a study he was conducting for 
a breakthrough project at the case company. The conclusion of their study was that 
breakthroughs should not be included into normal business, they should be treated separately. 
One of the reasons behind this was, that if you have it in the existing structure, if you need to 
prioritize and to show good figures short term, you will probably cut down on breakthrough 
innovations and prioritize the current production. 
The breakthrough innovation development is a risky process and the profits from the projects 
may come several years after the first costs. Divisional profit and loss statements provide a risk 
for the breakthrough projects as there might be too short focus. Therefore, it would be wise to 
explore organizational structure options where breakthroughs would be treated separately. This 
could happen in a completely separate unit outside of the divisional structures, or in separate 
structures within divisions, where shorter term profit targets are not the main drivers. 
 
Do not kill the fuzzy-front end in adjacent innovations: 
 
Even as this thesis will not go into detail what the adjacent unified model should be like, there 
is one point related to the adjacent model that caught the eye of the thesis writer, and which 
should be carefully thought of at the case company. Some of the interviewees suggested express 
stage-gate models or skipping some early steps for adjacent innovations. This could be related 
to for example already knowing the market well enough and just ticking the boxes and moving 
on. The author of the thesis does not recommend this approach. In the adjacent projects, the 
market and the customers are already better known, or at least they should be, in the beginning 
of the project. This does not mean that the company should take their knowledge of the market 
as an absolute fact. The market may have shifted or the needs of customers may have shifted. 
Moreover, Cooper (1998), Evans et al. 2013), Bertels et al. (2013) all discuss the importance of 
fuzzy-front-end development for all types of innovation. Case example from Toyota, also 
indicates the importance of the front-end and keeping the customer perspective as a key decision 
criteria in this front-end for adjacent type innovation projects (Balle 2005). Moreover, as the 
customers are already known and the relationships have already been built, testing the ideas 
and getting customer feedback should be easier than for breakthrough innovations. Therefore, 
the applicability of the Commercialization Framework as a key ingredient in the company-wide 
adjacent stage-gate model should be studied further.  
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Sometimes using the “express stage-gate” could still be possible, in case of low-budget and 
low-risk projects, as Cooper and Edgett (2012) propose. Using the “Express stage-gate” 
processes is only partly related to the question if the project is adjacent innovation. Adjacent 
innovation projects can still be expensive, and include relatively high amount of risk, and 
therefore need the fuzzy-front end to de-risk the process.  
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7 CONCLUSION 
7.1 Main findings and academic contribution 
This thesis discusses already identified methods in the academic literature that the best 
performing companies have been using to manage their innovation processes, with a key 
emphasis on breakthrough innovations. It follows constructive research approach (CRA) by 
Kasanen et al. (1993), CRA studies contribute to academic research by solving real life 
problems by building models, frameworks etc. that are backed by academic literature. This 
thesis builds and proposes a framework to manage the breakthrough innovation process for the 
case company. 
Previous studies have identified individual aspects that have been proven to be beneficial for 
breakthrough projects success, or in some cases aspects that based on intuition could be thought 
to be beneficial but have proven not to be. However, there is a lack of studies about more 
comprehensive framework to manage breakthrough innovations. Davila et al. (2005) called for 
further research on how to structure the control processes to support radical innovations to 
emerge. In addition to the academic studies, other key source of data used in this thesis were 
interviews with the heads of innovations at different divisions, and with other people linked to 
the innovation community at the case company. This constructive research thesis eventually 
proposed several areas that could be improved at the case company. “Tier 1” issues that were 
discussed in more detail were the constructed framework for breakthrough innovations and 
process unification at the case company. Other issues that were identified during the thesis 
work, but were discussed in lesser extent were labelled as “Tier 2” issues, and included cross-
divisional communication and a lack of software tool to document and share the project 
findings, governance of innovations and setting clear go / no-go criteria, identifying a home for 
breakthrough innovations, and discussing the fuzzy front-end for adjacent innovations. 
The area where this thesis contributes to academic research is proposing a stage-gate framework 
for breakthrough innovations. The proposed stage-gate model would be different than the 
typical linear stage-gate model in the first stages of the development, and it would be similar in 
the later stages. The first stages would rely less on financial factors and hard numbers related 
to market or customers, and the main focus would be on learning potential of the whole project 
and learning through iteration aiming to benefit the projects progress. The idea of not having 
one-size-fits-all stage-gate solutions is not in itself new, Cooper and Edgett (2008) propose this, 
nor is the suggestion that the front-end of the development is different for breakthrough type 
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innovations compared to other types of innovation (e.g. Bertels et al. 2013, Veryzer 1998). The 
suggestions of financial figures not working in breakthrough innovation project assessment is 
not new either (e.g. Nagji and Tuff 2012), nor is the suggestion that learning has a key role in 
breakthrough innovations (Nagji and Tuff 2012, Herstatt et al 2008, Bertles et al. 2013). The 
unique part and the contribution of this thesis is not in the detail of the constructed framework, 
but in gathering the details and constructing a single framework from the scattered details (see 
figure 5). 
Other key finding, and an area where this thesis relies less on academia and more on empiric 
evidence from the case company, is regarding innovation process unification and the perceived 
barriers to process unification. There has been an attempt of innovation process unification at 
the case company that resulted in one-size-fits-all solution. This solution had a life time of a 
few weeks before the divisions started to modify it to their needs. The interviewees justified 
having different processes based on the uniqueness of their business. However, the differences 
of the stage-gate models used at different divisions seemed to follow the role that breakthrough 
plays in the division innovation portfolio. The divisions that had more adjacent innovation 
projects in their portfolio had a process that was built mostly for adjacent innovations, and the 
division with mostly breakthrough had breakthrough focus. The only major difference from this 
trend was the division which had recently added a commercialization framework to run parallel 
with their stage-gate model. Therefore, the author of this thesis assumes that the big mistake 
was to try to build the one-size-fits-all solution, which caused the need to modify the stage-gate 
model to different types of innovations. If different stage-gate models are indeed built for 
adjacent and core, and for breakthrough innovations, there might not be this strong a need to 
differentiate from other divisions.  
The initial response from the case company indicates that they will seriously evaluate 
implementation of a separate process to assess breakthrough innovations in the future. This 
process should take into consideration the findings of this thesis and is likely to have many 
similarities with the proposed solution. In the same context the case company will include the 
evaluation of unifying breakthrough innovation processes across divisions. The tier 2 issues 
received a positive response at the case company but at this stage it is hard to analyse what the 
future holds for these topics 
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7.2 Limitations and possibilities for further research 
Limitations 
There are several limitations for this thesis, and they are related to the acquired information 
from the interviews, complexity of innovation environment, insider role of the author, and to 
gaps in the academic literature.  
The amount of people (1-2) interviewed from each division is small, and it raises a question if 
the acquired information truly reflects the reality in that division, or if it is simply an opinion 
of the interviewee. 
The innovation environment at the case company is also very complex, with hundreds of people 
working in different divisions, and in different countries. Truly understanding the whole 
innovation environment in the five months this thesis was written in, is a huge task, and it might 
be that some aspects were not seen at all or not considered enough. 
The role of core innovations is another limiting factor. Core innovations were part of the 
question sheets, but somehow the interviewees emphasized more the differences between 
breakthrough and adjacent innovations. Some left them out of the discussion all together. When 
it comes to breakthrough and adjacent innovations, there is credibility in the findings, but when 
it comes to core innovations, this thesis cannot make any grand claims how these types of 
projects should be run. 
The author of this thesis was on the case company’s payroll, but he did not hold any other 
functional role at the case organization. Still some of the three challenges of insider action 
research listed by Coghlan & Holian (2007) that the dual role as both researcher and 
organizational member may cause, may apply to this thesis also: 
1. The researcher has to simultaneously distance himself from the phenomena to be able 
to see things critically, while also drawing himself closer to the phenomena to 
understand it. 
2. The dual role as a researcher and as an organizational member may cause role confusion, 
role conflict or role overload.  
3. Organizational politics may cause the researcher to balance between his future career 
plans at the organization with the requirements and quality of his academic research. 
Excellent academic thesis may be considered as “failed” organizational research 
problem which could limit the career opportunities of the researcher.  
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Finally, there were gaps in the literature that affected the detail of which the author was 
confident of proposing solutions to the case company. These gaps are discussed below. 
Possibilities for further research 
This thesis was exploratory in nature, and due to this, four possibilities for further research 
arose during the thesis work. 
Two possible research questions were identified when clear missing topics were spotted in the 
literature review section of the thesis. The author could not find answers to the following 
questions: 
1. What type of factors should be included in project prioritization scorecards for different 
types of projects in different stages of the project? 
2. What type of factors should be included in project templates for different types of 
projects in different stages of the project? 
Cooper and Edgett (2012) study indicates that simply having clear go / kill criteria defined is a 
strong differentiating factor between the best performers (85%) and the worst performers 
(25.9%). They mention that the go / kill criteria are often in scorecard form. But what the 
scorecard should include is a trickier question. Should the content change depending on the 
stage of the project, or depending if we are speaking about breakthrough or adjacent innovation? 
What about if the company operates in certain industry, or if it simply depends on the strategy 
and competences of the company? The author of this thesis assumes that the answer to all the 
questions listed is yes, the content should vary. If this is indeed the case, then it becomes a 
question of how should the content vary. All the questions mentioned above can also be asked 
about project templates. Cooper and Edgett (2012) found that 90% of the best performing 
companies have clearly defined deliverables (usually templates), meanwhile from the worst 
performers 46.2% did. Clearly defined deliverables are clearly a best practice but what type of 
factors in the templates are the most important in which situations should be studied further. 
Two more possible research questions were identified when the data from the case company 
was compared to the existing literature:  
3. Are the best performing innovators indeed separated from the rest mainly by the way 
they handle breakthrough innovations? 
4. Should companies have the same or similar processes to run innovation projects in 
different divisions within the company, and what factors are most critical when thinking 
about how similar the processes should be? 
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Many of the seven principles identified by Cooper and Edgett (2008) came into discussion in 
the interviews specifically when speaking about breakthrough innovations. The seven 
principles were identified by looking at what practices the most productive innovators use. 
Moreover, Nagji and Tuff (2012) say that 70% of the returns in the best-performing innovator 
companies come from transformational innovations (highly similar with the breakthrough 
description). This would indicate that the best performers are indeed best performers due to the 
way they handle breakthrough innovations. 
This thesis proposes innovation process unification for the case company, but it does not 
suggest that the processes should be the same for all the divisions. However, this proposition 
was based on the interviews, where 4/6 interviewed functions supported process unification at 
least partially, rather than the academic consensus around the topic. The author of this thesis 
could not find a single study that would either justify or oppose having similar innovation 
processes for similar types of projects among different divisions of companies. Do the same 
types of innovations require different processes in different contexts is a question that has got 
less attention. Are the realities in different divisions indeed so different that similar processes 
regarding similar types of innovation (breakthrough / adjacent) are not possible? The natural 
assumption is that it depends on the context, or how different the contexts are. This raises a new 
question, what are the most important drivers behind how similar or different the processes 
should be? The interviewees of this thesis proposed reasons why they should vary, for example 
different business logics of the divisions, and how R&D heavy versus how customer driven the 
innovation processes are, while others proposed that there is no reason for the processes to vary.  
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8 APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Example question sheet for the interviews with head of innovations
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